



Security Council

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Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1911 (2010), the Security Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 May 2010 and expressed its intention to review in full, with a view to possible significant modifications, the mandate of UNOCI, as well as the authorization provided to the French forces which support it, the level of troops of UNOCI, and the benchmarks referred to in annex I to my report of 7 January 2010 (S/2010/15). The Council requested me, in paragraph 22 of that resolution, to provide a full report, including detailed recommendations and options for the future of UNOCI, as well as revised benchmarks based on the results of a technical assessment mission. The present report provides an update on major developments since my report of 7 January 2010, as well as the requested options, recommendations and benchmarks, based on the findings and proposals of a technical assessment mission.

II. Update on major developments related to the peace process

2. As indicated in my last report, the voter registration and identification operations, which were officially completed in November 2009, yielded a provisional electoral list of some 5.3 million persons confirmed by the technical operators (commonly referred to as the "white list") and some 1.03 million persons who remained to be confirmed (referred to as the "grey list"). On 3 December 2009, the Cadre permanent de concertation, composed of the main Ivorian political leaders — the President, Laurent Gbagbo; the Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro; the former President, Henry Konan Bedié, leader of the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire; and the former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, leader of the Rassemblement des républicains — took note of the credible manner in which the identification and voter registration operations had been conducted, and welcomed the provisional voters list. On that basis, the Cadre permanent de concertation endorsed a new electoral timetable providing for the completion of the final voters list in January 2010, and the presidential election by the end of February or the beginning of March 2010.

3. Early in January, however, reports surfaced about the existence of a separate parallel list of some 429,000 individuals, produced by the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, Robert Beugré Mambé, outside of the established



procedures. This controversy abruptly brought the electoral process to a halt as the ruling Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party maintained that the President of the Commission had committed fraud and that the provisional electoral list had been compromised. They called for Mr. Mambé's resignation. An inquiry instituted by the Prime Minister confirmed that Mr. Mambé had prepared a list of 429,000 persons without following the established procedures. Mr. Mambé rejected the calls for his resignation, insisting that he had developed the parallel list only for the "internal use" of the Commission.

4. The Facilitator consulted with Mr. Mambé and representatives of the main political parties in Ouagadougou on 11 February but the President of the Commission declined his advice to resign, prompting President Gbagbo to dissolve the Commission and the Government. The President requested the Prime Minister to form a new Government, stating that this would allow Côte d'Ivoire to move forward with credible elections. The new Government and Electoral Commission were installed on 23 February and 25 February, respectively.

5. Meanwhile, political tension rose amid reports that the ruling party had requested courts in a number of areas in central Côte d'Ivoire to purge ineligible individuals from the provisional electoral list. The reports triggered violent protests in several areas, including Abidjan, where one protestor was killed on 22 February, Gagnoa, where at least five people were killed on 19 February, and Daloa, where three people were killed on 22 February. On 20 February, mobs ransacked the offices of the *Préfecture* in the Forces nouvelles-controlled town of Bouaké, destroying civic records, burning six vehicles and 30 computers that had been recently donated by the World Bank. In Korhogo, also on 20 February, the residences of senior officials of the ruling party, including those of the party's spokesman and the Director of President Gbagbo's Cabinet, were attacked during violent protests.

6. In reaction to these events, President Gbagbo and the ruling party took the view that the security situation in the north would not allow free electoral campaigning and the conduct of free and fair elections there. They therefore called for disarmament and the reunification of the country before the elections as provided for in the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement (Ouagadougou IV). The opposition parties accused the ruling party and the President of using Ouagadougou IV as a pretext to delay the elections indefinitely. They also wrote to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, calling for an investigation into the killing of civilians during the violent protests.

7. Despite the establishment of the new Government and Electoral Commission, the electoral process remained stalled as the differences on how to address the issue of fraud and resume the interrupted appeals process on the provisional voters list persisted. While the opposition parties called for the resumption of the appeals process in order to produce the final voters list and conduct the presidential election, the ruling party insisted that the provisional list had to be audited, to remove fraudulently included individuals. It also called for the reconstitution of the 415 local electoral commissions, which it accused of involvement in the fraud, and maintained that disarmament and all aspects of the reunification of the country must be accomplished before the elections.

8. Tensions continued as the parties traded accusations, with senior members of the ruling party and its youth organizations disseminating harsh criticism of the Prime Minister and the Forces nouvelles Ministers for perpetuating the division of

the country so as to continue to benefit from both the Government and a parallel economy in the north. The media played a particularly negative role, publishing messages that fanned tensions among the parties. On 10 April, the President and the Prime Minister held a private meeting during which they agreed that the latter would continue to consult all stakeholders to find ways to resolve the impasse over the voters list.

III. Technical assessment mission

9. It was against this backdrop that a technical assessment mission travelled to Côte d'Ivoire from 12 to 22 April, pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 1911 (2010). Many questions were being raised at the time of the mission's visit regarding the continuing relevance of the Ouagadougou agreements, the continuing commitment of the signatories to the agreements and their confidence in the Facilitator, given the abrupt interruption of the electoral process and the media reports claiming that the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, was going to visit Côte d'Ivoire to engage in mediation. Those reports were refuted by President Wade himself.

10. The technical assessment mission comprised representatives of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, Political Affairs and Safety and Security, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Development Programme. The mission received detailed briefings from UNOCI, the United Nations country team and the French force (Licorne), and consulted a wide spectrum of national and international stakeholders, including President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro, the leaders of the opposition parties (Mr. Bedié and Mr. Ouattara), senior ruling opposition party officials, the Chief of Staff and senior officials of the Forces nouvelles, representatives of the Ivorian defence and security forces, the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, relevant Government Ministries, the Integrated Command Centre (ICC) in Yamoussoukro, and civil society organizations, as well as the diplomatic community (including representatives of the African Union and the European Union), international financial institutions and humanitarian organizations. The mission also consulted the Facilitator, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, in Ouagadougou, and the Facilitator's Special Representative in Abidjan, Bouréïma Badini. It visited several places, including Bouaké, Duékoué, Guiglo and Séguéla.

A. Findings of the technical assessment mission

1. Status of implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and supplementary agreements

11. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement, signed on 4 March 2007, and its supplementary agreements, sought to resolve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire by addressing outstanding issues related to the identification and election processes, the reunification of the army, and the restoration of State authority throughout the country. Its specific provisions are explained in my reports of 14 May 2007 (S/2007/275) and 2 January 2008 (S/2008/1). The fourth supplementary agreement

(Ouagadougou IV), signed on 22 December 2008, which is now the focus of attention, clarified the modalities and timeline for conducting, before the elections, the cantonment and storage of weapons of the former combatants of the ex-belligerent forces; the dismantling of the militias; the relaunch of the process to reunify the Ivorian defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles; and the completion, by 15 January 2009, of the effective redeployment of State administration throughout the country, including the *corps préfectoral*, the judiciary and the fiscal and Customs administrations.

12. The original schedule for the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement had envisaged that all tasks set out in the Agreement would have been completed by 4 January 2008. The implementation process, however, has been delayed by a mix of factors, including underestimation by the parties of the time required to implement some complex tasks; lack of capacity on the part of the national implementing institutions; logistical and other resource constraints; and differences that emerged among the parties on the practical modalities for the implementation of the most sensitive tasks, such as the identification operations. The lack of political will has also contributed significantly to the delays.

13. Despite these delays and the frustration with the current impasse, all stakeholders recognized that the Ouagadougou agreements have achieved more progress towards resolving the Ivorian crisis than any of the preceding peace agreements. On the basis of the sustained stability in the country throughout 2007 and 2008, and the confidence that the Ouagadougou agreements had developed among the main Ivorian stakeholders, the parties had reached an understanding to conduct the first round of the presidential election on 30 November 2008, indicating their conviction that elections could be held before disarmament and reunification of the country. However, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, following the violent incidents of February 2010, President Gbagbo and the ruling party are now insisting on disarmament and the reunification of the country before the elections. Consequently, the efforts to move the peace process forward and complete the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreements are now focusing on two central issues, namely, (1) elections; and (2) disarmament and reunification — which consists of the restoration of State authority with centralization of the treasury, disarmament and integration of Forces nouvelles personnel in the military, gendarmerie and police, as well as the reintegration and dismantling of militias. Many interlocutors, including the Facilitator, advised that the issues surrounding these two processes, which are explained below, must be tackled concomitantly in order to remove any pretexts by any of the parties for not carrying out their obligations.

2. Elections

14. Three main issues need to be resolved to move the electoral process forward, namely, the question of fraud, the modalities for processing the “white” and “grey” lists to produce the final voters list, and completion of the remaining technical processes. President Gbagbo and his party maintain that there was massive fraud in the preparation of the provisional voters list. The President, who held two meetings with the technical assessment mission, identified two specific aspects of the questions of the fraud. The first relates to the alleged manipulation of the list by the former President of the Electoral Commission, and the second was what the President described as “non-political” fraud by nationals of neighbouring countries

who simply wish to become Ivorian citizens. The President presented to the mission, as evidence of fraud, documents including pre-signed and stamped but blank birth certificates and certificates of nationality that were reportedly being sold to non-Ivorians in large numbers in several towns, as well as voters lists from a number of districts, which included individuals identified as foreigners. The President also insisted that the list must be verified, while the ruling party, FPI, called for an audit. The President further informed the mission that he had requested the Prime Minister, who is not a candidate in the elections, to consult all stakeholders and put in place a verification process as soon as possible.

15. The opposition political parties insisted that Mr. Mambé did not commit any fraud and that the provisional list had not been compromised by the preparation of the parallel list of 429,000 individuals. According to Mr. Ouattara, Mr. Mambé informed all the Ivorian political leaders and the Facilitator about the parallel list during the meeting of the Cadre permanent de concertation on 3 December, thus confirming that he was acting in good faith. The Cadre permanent de concertation reportedly advised Mr. Mambé to discontinue preparation of a third list.

16. For his part, the Facilitator stressed that resolving the issues surrounding the electoral list was critical for progress in all other aspects of the peace process. In his view, nearly all the tasks related to the provisional voters list had been completed and the “white list” was the outcome of a broadly accepted and credible operation, the achievement of which must be preserved. At the same time, he recognized that it was essential to restore the confidence of the parties in the list, in view of the issue of fraud. This view was shared by many international stakeholders who were consulted by the mission, including members of the diplomatic corps. For their part, the technical operators, the Ivorian Institut national de la statistique and Sagem, maintained that they strictly followed the procedures agreed upon by the parties in preparing the provisional voters list.

17. The Facilitator advised that all stakeholders should support the ongoing efforts by the Prime Minister to conduct additional technical verification of the list in order to restore the confidence of all parties. The new President of the Independent Electoral Commission similarly supported the Prime Minister’s efforts and stated that it would not be possible to conduct elections with a disputed list and in a climate of insecurity.

18. The Prime Minister has been conducting a series of consultations with all stakeholders to find an agreed way forward. The UNOCI Electoral Assistance Division and Certification Cell are participating in the consultations as observers while they also continue to provide technical advice and assistance to the new Electoral Commission. On 2 May, the Prime Minister and the President of the Commission issued a joint statement setting out a new calendar for processing the provisional electoral list. The first stage of the exercise would begin on 10 May and allow the persons registered on the “grey list” to give evidence for registration on the provisional electoral list (the “white list”). The second stage of the appeals process, which concerns the 5.3 million people currently registered on the “white list”, will be conducted at an unspecified later date. However, political parties were reported to be divided over the decision. The opposition party RHDP (Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix) rejected the decision, stating, inter alia, that it did not conform to the three-week time frame for completing the resumed appeals process set by the Facilitator after consulting the parties in Abidjan

on 22 February. The operations on the “grey list”, meanwhile, gradually started during the week of 17 May and President Gbagbo has held direct discussions with Mr. Bedié on 10 May and with Mr. Ouattara on 17 May in an effort to move forward the stalled electoral process.

3. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, dismantling of militias and reunification of the security forces

19. The opposition parties expressed the view that the ruling party’s demand for the Forces nouvelles to disarm was a pretext for delaying the presidential election. They further argued that any such debate was unnecessary because the parties had previously agreed that the presidential election could be conducted in November 2008 before disarmament. President Gbagbo and the ruling party, however, contended that the trust on which that “gentleman’s agreement” had been based was shattered by the violence in February and that therefore the full implementation of Ouagadougou IV was essential to create a secure climate in the north for the election. The Prime Minister expressed the view that the question whether disarmament and reunification should be accomplished before the election was not an issue because it is an explicit requirement under Ouagadougou IV. Both the Prime Minister and, at separate meetings, senior Forces nouvelles officials informed the technical assessment mission that they were committed to respecting that agreement, and stated that the cantonment process would be conducted in phases beginning with the site at Korhogo in May.

20. The Prime Minister, however, emphasized that the real issue at the centre of the current impasse was the identification of voters, arguing that, if the Forces nouvelles combatants were to be convinced to complete the disarmament process, they must be assured that they would receive the national identity cards for which they took up arms in the first place. In the Prime Minister’s view, the voters list was designated by the Ouagadougou Agreement as the vehicle through which Ivorians would receive their identity cards, and therefore preparation of the final voters list is a sine qua non for the completion of the disarmament process.

21. The Forces nouvelles Chief of Staff, General Bakayoko, senior Forces nouvelles officials and the opposition parties pointed out that Ouagadougou IV also stipulates the disarmament and dismantling of militias. Under the agreement, the cantonment must be completed no later than two months prior to the date set for the presidential election, while the demobilization of Forces nouvelles ex-combatants and the disarmament and dismantlement of militias should be completed one month before. It is estimated that both processes will have a total caseload of 75,318 personnel (32,777 Forces nouvelles and 42,451 militia).

22. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme faces many challenges, notably the lack of capacity of the Integrated Command Centre, which is the principal national implementing body; lack of resources for the preparation of the cantonment sites and the upkeep of the former combatants in the cantonment sites; the inability of the Government, so far, to pay the promised demobilization allowance of CFA 500,000 (approximately US\$ 1,000) to the ex-combatants and militia personnel; inadequate reintegration/reinsertion opportunities for demobilized combatants; and the implications of the identity issue for this programme, as mentioned above. Many interlocutors advised the technical assessment mission that addressing these challenges will require both technical and material assistance from

international partners. Without such support, the challenges may serve as a pretext for not making progress.

23. The Ouagadougou agreements narrow the focus of security sector reform almost solely on the reunification of the Ivorian defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles, leaving the development of the country's new security sector policy and architecture for after the election. However, a wide range of security sector reform initiatives can already be supported by UNOCI. At meetings with the technical assessment mission, local and international partners indicated the significant impact that security sector reform could have, even before the elections, in restoring confidence, consolidating achievements, strengthening the rule of law, and contributing to the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. They also indicated that UNOCI has a comparative advantage in playing a leadership and coordination role for international support to security sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire and should avail itself of the institutional capacity to do so.

4. Restoration of State authority and centralization of the treasury

24. Despite the lifting of the zone of confidence which had physically divided the country and prevented the free movement of people and the delivery of goods and services between the north and the south, Côte d'Ivoire is still a divided country, with the Forces nouvelles maintaining a parallel administration, economy, treasury, judicial system and security structures in the north. While all *préfets* and *sous-préfets* have been redeployed to the areas controlled by the Forces nouvelles, its zone commanders, and Forces nouvelles-appointed mayors and other local authorities continue to exercise real authority and collect revenues in the north. No progress has been made with regard to the redeployment of Customs officials to the north, and all border crossing points in the north remain staffed by the Forces nouvelles. A few tax agents were redeployed at the regional level, but they remain largely non-operational. Similarly, regional representations of line ministries have been established, but remain largely non-operational.

25. The mixed brigades deployed by the Integrated Command Centre, which have the task, inter alia, of maintaining law and order, lack adequate manpower and resources, and are not able to protect the population and the re-established State institutions. They maintain an uneasy coexistence with the heavily armed and well-financed Forces nouvelles security machinery. Personnel from the *Préfecture* in Bouaké informed the technical assessment mission that they were feeling secure and had started performing their duties without serious hindrance, until the violent incidents of February.

26. As noted in my last report, many courts in the north and the west are non-operational. The Bouaké court of appeal and the tribunal in Korhogo continue to experience difficulties in attaining the quorum of judges. In addition, the tribunals in Man and Katiola remain closed since February, when staff abandoned their posts following the violent disturbances there. The redeployment of Ivorian penitentiary staff to prison facilities in the north remains pending.

27. President Gbagbo and the ruling party insisted that the Forces nouvelles must dismantle the parallel economy, treasury, administration and security structures, in particular its zone commander system, in the north and allow the redeployed State institutions to carry out their functions. They stressed that the Forces nouvelles have been part of the Government, its Secretary-General being Prime Minister since

2007, and therefore it was unacceptable for the Forces nouvelles to continue to run a parallel administration, economy and treasury in a part of the country. They also pointed out that Côte d'Ivoire's resources continued to be siphoned off to neighbouring countries and stressed the responsibilities of those countries to cooperate with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in preventing the illegal exploitation of its resources.

28. The technical assessment mission raised these issues with the Prime Minister and the Forces nouvelles. The Prime Minister stated that Customs officers will be assigned to the north beginning in May as a step towards the reunification of the treasury, and indicated that the zone commanders would step down from their posts as their combatants are demobilized or cantoned. At a meeting devoted to the issue of the parallel economy, the Minister of Industry, Moussa Dosso, who also serves as the Forces nouvelles's Finance Minister in the north, informed the mission that discussions were ongoing on arrangements for dismantling the parallel economy and treasury.

29. For their part, the opposition parties expressed the view that claims of the absence of State authority and recurring insecurity in the north were grossly overstated, and that most of the State officials and judiciary have been redeployed. Mr. Ouattara and Mr. Bedié pointed out, inter alia, that these issues were a pretext for delaying the elections. In that regard, they referred to the Security Council meeting of 28 April 2009, at which the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire, Ambassador Alcide Djédjé, made a statement to the effect, among other things, that "the restoration of State authority and the redeployment of State administration throughout the country are nearly complete" (see S/PV.6113).

B. Security situation

30. The current security situation in Côte d'Ivoire was characterized by many as a dangerous tinderbox. The dispute over the voters list has created a crisis of confidence and polarized not only the main political actors but also the population. The resulting political tensions have severely undermined the relative stability that had prevailed over the past three years since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement. If not managed in a fair and transparent manner, the processing of the voters list, on which the delicate issue of identity hinges, could trigger widespread violence. Many interlocutors stressed that the violent protests in February were not about the dissolution of the Government and the Electoral Commission but against attempts to arbitrarily remove large numbers of people from the provisional voters list, which would have deprived them of Ivorian citizenship.

31. Côte d'Ivoire is still rife with armed militia groups, in particular in the west. Although their actual strength and military capabilities cannot be assessed accurately, they form a well structured organization. Similarly, armed and unarmed urban youth groups in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and San-Pedro are often manipulated by the key political stakeholders and pose a serious threat to the population. Other long-standing sources of insecurity in the west could fuel any violence that may erupt as a result of the current political stalemate. These include banditry and armed criminality, which are still commonplace, and the frequent inter- and intra-community clashes in that area, particularly over land. In addition, unregulated and porous

borders, particularly in the north, allow for the circulation, with little scrutiny, of small arms and natural resources, as well as trafficking of drugs and persons.

32. An unravelling of the Ouagadougou Agreement could create a worst case security scenario. Possible developments that could unravel the Agreement include a breakdown in the working relationship between the President and the Prime Minister; a withdrawal from the process by either of the two signatories; a withdrawal from the process by the Facilitator; or a resort to extraordinary measures that would undermine the Agreement, including possible declarations by the Constitutional Council relating to the elections.

33. Some interlocutors, however, did not rule out the worst case scenario of a return to full-scale conflict in the event of a temptation to impose State authority in the north by force. The current impasse and the negative tone of the discourse on issues related to identity, disarmament and reunification appear to be rekindling suspicions between the two forces. The Forces nouvelles repeatedly raised with the technical assessment mission the ongoing repair of the national army's MI-24 helicopter, which they said is an indication that the Government may be retaining the option of reunifying the country by force. Other interlocutors, however, believe that direct military conflict between the two forces is unlikely.

34. Many of the mission's interlocutors, including the Facilitator, expressed concern about the social cost of the prolonged crisis and warned that the rising poverty rates, shrinking access to basic goods and services, high youth unemployment, and the high cost of living for most of the population could trigger social unrest. These factors could lead to spontaneous or politically manipulated violent demonstrations, particularly in the major urban centres, and a possible escalation into armed clashes.

35. The impact of renewed instability in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular the worst case scenario of a return to conflict, could have repercussions for the wider subregion. In this regard, many of the mission's interlocutors advised that, in taking a decision regarding the continued presence of UNOCI and its role in Côte d'Ivoire, the Security Council should also take into account the importance of the country for the stability of the wider subregion.

C. Role of the media

36. Many interlocutors were very concerned about the negative role that the Ivorian media is playing in fanning tensions, the monopoly of access to the State-owned media by the ruling party, and the uneven media landscape in the north. Opposition parties complained that they did not have any access to the State media. The negative conduct of the media and the monopoly that the ruling party maintains on access to State media is in breach of article 6.6 of the Ouagadougou Agreement relating to the promotion of peace, national reconciliation and security. The technical assessment mission therefore raised this matter with the Facilitator, who indicated that he plans to meet with the owners of the various media houses during his next visit to Abidjan. Many newspapers are affiliated to political parties and it is therefore important to impress upon the parties their obligation to fully respect the code of good conduct which they signed during a ceremony I attended on 24 April 2008 in Abidjan and to act in accordance with the provisions on incitement of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

D. Human rights situation

37. Violations of human rights continued across the country, in particular in the west and in the former zone of confidence, where unidentified armed individuals and members of militia groups operate with impunity. Prominent among the violations are sexual violence, racketeering and theft. A particularly disturbing feature of the human rights situation in the west is the frequency of sexual violence against children, which most interlocutors believed to be on the rise. Furthermore, women and young girls continue to suffer from harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation and forced and early marriage. In several regions, notably in the west, interlocutors reported a deterioration of the protection situation, with reports that intercommunal clashes were frequent. Uniformed military and police officers also continued to commit serious human rights violations with impunity. Officials of the national human rights commission and leaders of Ivorian human rights organizations recognized the lack of capacity to respond to the daunting human rights challenges facing the country. Most stakeholders agreed that the national law enforcement institutions are not properly trained or equipped to control civil disturbances.

E. Humanitarian situation

38. Humanitarian activities remain focused on reintegration and protection of internally displaced persons and returnees in the west, as well as on malnutrition and food security issues that have reached alarming levels in areas in the north. As at the end of March 2010, a total of 89,668 internally displaced persons had returned voluntarily to their areas of origin. A remaining caseload of approximately 31,000 persons continued to live with host families, primarily in the departments of Bloléquin and Guiglo in the west. In some return areas, land disputes and impunity continued to affect prospects for sustainable socio-economic reintegration.

39. As the priorities in the country are broadly shifting from relief to development, the humanitarian coordination framework has been adjusted to concurrently cover the residual emergencies and emerging recovery needs. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has scaled down its staffing in Côte d'Ivoire and as from 1 July 2010 will integrate its coordination and contingency planning capacities in the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and its regional office in Dakar. Addressing the funding gap for the continuing provision of services to the affected population will remain a priority.

F. Economic situation

40. The technical assessment mission met with the country representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank, who provided an assessment of the economic situation in Côte d'Ivoire. They informed the mission that the country's macroeconomic situation has continued to improve and its economic programme has been broadly on track, despite delays in its implementation. Notwithstanding the global economic and financial crisis, growth accelerated in 2009 to 3.8 per cent. Prospects for 2010 are somewhat dampened however by outstanding elections, power outages, and a transport strike in April, and economic growth is projected to decelerate to 3 per cent. Inflation is

expected to remain low (2.5 per cent) and the external current account surplus strong because of high cocoa prices. Structural reforms are being implemented very slowly, however.

41. Since the decision point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was reached in March 2009, there has been progress in both the implementation of the HIPC completion point triggers and rolling out the Government's poverty reduction strategy. Improved debt management is particularly important for Côte d'Ivoire as unsustainably high levels of debt over the past two decades have left little fiscal space for it to invest adequately in health and education.

42. The political crisis has rolled back much of the social progress registered by the country in the past decades. Macroeconomic stability of the last three years has not translated into poverty reduction. Poverty is at an all-time high and is most severe in rural areas and in the north, where 70 per cent of the people live in poverty. Nearly all social development indicators have stagnated or deteriorated. Infrastructure services required to facilitate economic activity, a decent quality of life and regional integration have also deteriorated, owing to disinvestment and neglect.

G. Peace consolidation

43. In my report of 14 May 2007 (S/2007/275), I highlighted, among other things, the deteriorating socio-economic conditions, insecurity, and land disputes in the west, and difficulties in the delivery of social services in the north. In that regard, I recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations country team should increase assistance to the Government and Ivorian civil society in developing initiatives for the promotion of social cohesion and national reconciliation, as well as the restoration of basic social services.

44. The interlocutors of the technical assessment mission in the west stressed that those challenges remain as destabilizing factors in those areas. There is particular concern with respect to young people, who are easily manipulated by political actors, suffer directly from lack of access to land, and may have also missed out on educational opportunities during the crisis. Official statistics cite 4 million unemployed or underemployed youth throughout the country. Conflict over land continues, serving both as a root cause and as a flashpoint for conflict, while efforts to structurally address the problem are not resulting in concrete peace dividends. Uncontrolled immigration is also becoming a source of concern. Community groups in the west cited the lack of the full resumption of social services, including water and sanitation, health care and education, as an overriding problem, further noting that the lack of such services resulted in a lost opportunity to enhance social cohesion.

45. The integrated strategic framework, prepared by UNOCI and the United Nations country team, highlights the need for the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire to support the re-establishment of social services and address the root causes of the conflict, taking into account their impact on the ongoing peace process. However, the United Nations country team is underfunded in this respect.

46. Beyond the socio-economic sector, other State services are not meeting their potential to build peace. Law and order as a service is not being adequately provided. Identification, beyond elections, is fundamental to relations between the State and society. Documentary proof of identity is needed to own land, but also to

access social services such as national school exams. Most people cannot obtain such documentation at a reasonable time and cost, fuelling their insecurity.

47. At the community level, a variety of efforts to address conflict have been undertaken, including through village peace committees. They have helped significantly with the peaceful return of displaced persons and the expansion of participation in local decision-making. These efforts, however, are not connected together regionally or nationally, and do not inform national-level peace processes. More generally, the peace process has so far insufficiently benefited from the involvement of civil society.

48. Finally, humanitarian and development partners reported diminished funding. Humanitarian funding has dropped, while the growth of development assistance has stalled. Official development assistance per capita to Côte d'Ivoire remains very low (\$8.2) compared to countries with similar human development index ranks and especially to other post-conflict countries in the region. Meanwhile, funding from the Peacebuilding Fund for the office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator will be exhausted by the end of September 2010.

IV. Role of UNOCI

49. The mandate of UNOCI was adjusted in Security Council resolution 1765 (2007) in order to adapt the role of the Operation to the new realities following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, in particular the decision of the signatories of the Agreement to assume total ownership of the peace process and to give national institutions the lead role in implementing the tasks set out in the Agreement. The Council endorsed the recommendations set out in paragraphs 42 to 72 of my report of 14 May 2007 (S/2007/275), which further defined the role of UNOCI in support of those implementation arrangements. The Council also approved the recommendations set out in paragraphs 75 to 83 of that report, related to providing assistance to the vulnerable population; supporting efforts to create a positive political environment; supporting efforts to promote and protect human rights; and supporting the economic recovery process.

50. In its resolutions 1880 (2009) and 1911 (2010), the Security Council requested UNOCI to bring its full support to the implementation of the remaining tasks under the Ouagadougou agreements, in particular those that are essential to the holding of the presidential election; provide technical and logistical support to the Electoral Commission; support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the disarmament and dismantling of militias; continue to assist the Government in restoring State authority, including a civilian policing presence and rule of law institutions throughout the country; continue to assist the Facilitator and his Special Representative in Abidjan; and continue to work closely with humanitarian agencies in areas of tension and with respect to the return of displaced persons in order to respond to possible outbreaks of violence and other threats against civilians in a timely and appropriate manner.

51. The perennial delays in the peace process, in particular the uncertainty of the time frame for the elections and the evolving situation on the ground, call for a further review of the role of UNOCI. Many interlocutors expressed the view that the Security Council's decision, in resolution 1911 (2010), to focus the role of UNOCI on providing full assistance to the parties in the implementation of the remaining

tasks under the Ouagadougou Agreement, particularly elections, disarmament, and the restoration of effective State authority, was a fitting response to the realities on the ground. All interlocutors advised that a premature withdrawal of UNOCI before the country has sufficiently stabilized could result in a reversal of the progress achieved to date, and that sustainable stability in Côte d'Ivoire cannot be achieved as long as there are still two armed forces and the country remains divided administratively and economically. They therefore stressed that the United Nations should help the country to implement the disarmament processes in keeping with Ouagadougou IV; restore State authority and reunify the economy; prepare a final voters list; and hold elections, before the departure of UNOCI. They however cautioned that the mission should work towards concomitant progress on the electoral and reunification processes in order to avoid being caught in the vicious circle created by the discourse on whether disarmament and reunification should come before elections. The Minister for Internal Affairs expressed the view that it would be important to retain UNOCI in the country until the legislative elections are held, and that the post-election arrangements regarding UNOCI and the United Nations system should be discussed with a newly elected Government.

52. On the basis of its assessment of the situation on the ground, and taking into account the views and proposals received from various interlocutors, the technical assessment mission concluded that the tasks set out for UNOCI in resolutions 1880 (2009) and 1911 (2010) remain essential to the core mandate of the Operation. However, a number of issues and dilemmas emanating from the evolving political and security situation and the national ownership of the peace process were brought to the mission's attention, as explained below. It is essential to take these issues into account in considering the renewal of the UNOCI mandate.

A. Security aspects

53. The troop strength of the UNOCI military component currently stands at 7,391 personnel, including 7,198 troops and 193 military observers, against an authorized ceiling of 7,450 military personnel. The strength of the UNOCI police component is 1,151 personnel, comprising 402 police advisers and 749 personnel in the six formed police units. The police component's authorized strength stands at 1,200 elements. The strength of the French *Licorne* force remains at 900 troops, who are deployed primarily in the Abidjan area. By its resolution 1911 (2010), the Security Council had extended its authorization for *Licorne* forces to provide support to UNOCI, within the limits of their deployment and their capabilities, until 31 May 2010.

54. Various interlocutors of the technical assessment mission conveyed concerns and misperceptions about the security role of the UNOCI military and police components, which have implications for the credibility of the Operation. The main issue raised by the majority of stakeholders in this regard is the role of those components in protecting vulnerable civilians faced by violence.

55. The Minister for Internal Affairs advised the technical assessment mission that UNOCI should step in to assist national authorities in protecting the population and redeployed State institutions only if requested by the Government. That, however, could create a dilemma for UNOCI if a request were made to intervene only in response to violent protests involving the opposition political parties. In this regard,

it is worth noting that Security Council resolution 1739 (2007) provides that UNOCI, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, shall protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.

56. The limited capacity of the Integrated Command Centre remains a serious issue of concern. As at April 2010, only 1,053 (726 Ivorian defence and security forces and 327 Forces nouvelles personnel) out of the stipulated 8,000 had been assigned to the Centre's mixed gendarmerie brigades and police units. Of the 23 planned mixed brigades, only 11 have been established. The Forces nouvelles have requested assistance to support their elements in the mixed units, noting that whereas the defence and security forces receive a salary, the Forces nouvelles mixed brigade members do not. Several interlocutors also raised the need to properly equip the Integrated Command Centre and the mixed units, especially in logistical, communications and non-lethal crowd control equipment, which would require the Security Council to consider making an exemption to the arms embargo to import riot control gear, including side arms.

57. UNOCI, Licorne, the national defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles have jointly developed a security plan for the elections. The integrated security plan, which combines all United Nations security elements, takes into account the Integrated Command Centre security organization for the elections and factors in the capacity deficiencies of the Centre, outlined above. The security plan will need to be reviewed pending the Security Council's decision on the future role of UNOCI. In the first phase of pre-elections, the Operation will identify the areas at greatest risk of violence and adapt existing contingency plans to address the threat together with a show of presence and strength both to deter and to reassure. In the second phase, during elections, UNOCI will constantly monitor the situation and assist the Integrated Command Centre in ensuring freedom of movement for the population. Escorts will be provided to UNOCI and international observer teams as well as for the transportation of personnel and materials. The military will be prepared to react with an air and ground quick reaction force. In phase three, the post-election and stabilization period, UNOCI will closely monitor the situation for disturbances caused by disaffected parties and assist the Integrated Command Centre in providing security for electoral and sensitive materials.

58. In my report of 7 January 2010 (S/2010/15), I referred to the joint proposal by President Gbagbo and President Compaoré to deploy, as part of UNOCI, up to 500 troops from Burkina Faso to reinforce security arrangements during the elections that were expected to be held by March 2010. The Ivorian Minister for Internal Affairs and advisers to President Gbagbo informed the technical assessment mission that the proposal has been shelved. The mission therefore explored other contingency alternatives to cover the security gap during the elections. Proposals in this regard are included in paragraphs 97 to 100 of the present report.

59. The second issue raised by interlocutors was related to the role of UNOCI in providing security for the elections, in particular in the event that any party attempts to disrupt the elections by force, or resorts to armed violence to challenge the results. This issue was of particular concern to the opposition parties, the Forces nouvelles and civil society. The Forces nouvelles proposed that UNOCI should deploy in the cantonment areas to ensure that the cantoned Forces nouvelles and defence and security force troops do not leave the cantonment areas to interfere with

the arrangements provided for under the Ouagadougou agreements for securing the elections. With regard to the capability deficiencies of the Integrated Command Centre and its mixed units, which are mandated to maintain law and order and provide security for the elections, Prime Minister Soro, in a letter dated 6 May 2010 addressed to me, requested that UNOCI contribute to the strengthening of the Centre's operational capacities, in order to reassure all parties and the population that the necessary security arrangements for the elections are in place, in line with article 9 of Ouagadougou IV. President Gbagbo had mentioned to the technical assessment mission that a possible solution would be to directly merge the Forces nouvelles personnel earmarked to join the army and the national security forces that already have the requisite capacity, and charge them with assuming this important responsibility.

B. Elections and certification

60. In keeping with its mandate, UNOCI has provided technical and logistical assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission and other national implementing institutions responsible for operations related to the identification and electoral processes. Specifically, UNOCI has provided transportation for electoral materials to the Commission's warehouses, refurbished identification and voter registration centres, provided transportation of registration agents, and trained judges and registration agents. All stakeholders recognized that, without the support that UNOCI has provided to date, the technical and logistical challenges encountered by the Commission would have caused even more serious delays to the electoral process. They requested that UNOCI be authorized to continue providing this critical support. Many stakeholders, particularly the international partners, however, expressed concern that the new Commission, which was installed on 25 February, had not started tackling the key issues that are blocking the electoral process and taking steps to complete the outstanding technical processes.

61. A number of proposals were communicated to the technical assessment mission regarding the implementation of the certification mandate of my Special Representative. To date, my Special Representative has defined the certification framework, comprising five criteria as explained in my previous reports, and certified two critical stages of the electoral process, namely, the successful completion of the identification and voter registration operations and the preparation of the provisional voters list, which he described as "balanced and credible" prior to the appearance of the contentious parallel list of 429,000 individuals.

62. While some leaders of the political opposition parties stated that they clearly understood the framework developed by my Special Representative for the certification of the electoral process and welcomed his endorsement of the completion of the identification and voter registration processes and the provisional voters list, they informed the technical assessment mission that they intended to discuss with my Special Representative the certification in the context of the peace and security criteria, especially the role of the State media and the monopoly of access by the ruling party. For their part, the ruling party and the President's advisers expressed the view that they could not envisage certification of elections that may be held in the north under the current insecure environment as free and fair. Many international stakeholders were satisfied with the manner in which the certification mandate had been dispensed and encouraged my Special Representative

to continue to work closely with the Facilitator, who has the arbitration mandate. They also stressed the importance of enhancing the UNOCI public information campaign and constant engagement with the political parties, to clarify any queries they and the public may have on certification. In his letter dated 6 May, the Prime Minister also stressed the importance of clarifying the certification process and methodology to avoid divergent interpretations by the political actors.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, dismantling of militias and security sector reform

63. Under the Ouagadougou Agreement the impartial forces are requested to supervise the disarmament and demobilization and cantonment of Forces nouvelles combatants, the storage of their weapons, and the disarmament and dismantling of the militias. Given the limited capacity of the Integrated Command Centre, which is responsible for the implementation of these tasks, UNOCI has been supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme by, inter alia, constructing cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites, providing planning assistance to the Integrated Command Centre and the National Programme for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation, and securing the weapons and ammunition collected so far. The Forces nouvelles and international partners requested UNOCI to assist with further rehabilitation of barracks at the cantonment sites in Bouaké, Séguéla and Man so as to avoid delaying the Forces nouvelles cantonment operations.

64. The Forces nouvelles leadership advised that another issue that could delay the cantonment of the 5,000 former combatants earmarked to join the new army was the lack of funding to sustain them once cantoned, and requested the international community to provide assistance with this. Furthermore, the Forces nouvelles Chief of Staff, General Bakayoko, proposed that UNOCI should assist in providing basic military training to the 5,000 personnel in the cantonment camps.

65. All stakeholders commended my Special Representative's initiatives to implement 1,000 microprojects, which provide reintegration opportunities for former combatants. The initiative was conceived as a stop-gap measure to accommodate demobilized combatants who had not received the allowance of CFA 500,000 stipulated in the Ouagadougou Agreement; however limited funding has meant that the programme has accommodated only 3,720 ex-combatants. Some interlocutors suggested that the international community should consider payment of the allowance for the remaining caseload of 23,257 demobilized Forces nouvelles combatants and 42,451 militia, which would cost approximately \$60 million. Donors, however, indicated that they were not favourable to funding such cash payments because of concern over inflated numbers, as well as the belief that, unlike the microprojects model, such cash payments were unlikely to provide for sustainable reintegration opportunities for the ex-combatants. Moreover, a key issue raised with the technical assessment mission was the need for the Government, which has the responsibility to pay this allowance, to clarify whether former combatants who benefit from the microprojects would still be entitled to receive the allowance.

D. Restoration of State authority and peace consolidation

66. By Security Council resolutions 1880 (2009) and 1911 (2010) UNOCI was mandated to facilitate the re-establishment by the Government of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire and of the institutions and public services essential for the social and economic recovery of the country, and to support the restoration of rule of law institutions in the north and west, in particular the judicial system and police, as part of the overall restoration of State authority and administration throughout the country.

67. The role of UNOCI in supporting the restoration of State authority has so far focused on monitoring and supporting the redeployment of civil servants, including the judiciary, to the north, which stands at 96 per cent. To that end, UNOCI worked closely with the *préfets* and *sous-préfets*, with line ministry officials, and with the Government's Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'Administration. The working and housing conditions of the *corps préfectoral* have also significantly improved, further to technical expertise and logistic support provided by UNOCI, in cooperation with the United Nations country team. UNOCI also strengthened the conflict management and conflict resolution capacities of local authorities. Support from the international community, including the World Bank and the European Commission, has resulted in the rehabilitation and equipping of administrative, court and penitentiary facilities.

68. Considering that the Forces nouvelles have been part of the Government for the past three years, many interlocutors were of the view that the lack of political will and the benefits from the parallel economy in the north are the only reason why they would not allow the full restoration of State authority in the areas under their control. As indicated earlier, the Forces nouvelles, for their part, cite the need to resolve the identity issue, the need for the Government to provide the funding for the demobilization and cantonment of the Forces nouvelles combatants, and the need to ensure that the Forces nouvelles had a sustainable source of funding to maintain themselves as an organization. To move forward on the reunification of the treasury and the restoration of the fiscal and Customs administration in the north, the future of the Forces nouvelles will need to be addressed.

E. Human rights aspects

69. UNOCI continued to strengthen the capacities of national human rights institutions, as well as those of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and other Government departments. UNOCI also continued to raise human rights awareness in universities, colleges and schools, and monitored and reported on human rights violations throughout the country, paying particular attention to the situation of women and children. In spite of these achievements, many interlocutors considered that the human rights and protection situation had actually deteriorated over the reporting period. Of particular concern is the reported increase in sexual violence, including against children, which some interlocutors believed was increasingly taking on an ethnic dimension. The Bangolo-Duékoué axis was referred to by interlocutors of the technical assessment mission as especially prone to violent attacks. More systematic and reliable data collection and information-sharing on the human rights and protection situation, including as called for in Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), which are now lacking, would further

strengthen efforts to prevent and respond to violations. The mission also noted a number of opportunities for improving the coordination between military, police and civilian protection and human rights actors. Several interlocutors also called for UNOCI to speak out more frequently and publicly on human rights concerns in the country, particularly sexual violence. Women's groups called for increased support to ensure their access to and participation in political dialogue. During his meeting with the technical assessment mission, Mr. Bedié denounced as incongruous and not respecting democratic principles of freedom of expression the charges of a military tribunal against Mr. Djédjé-Mady, Secretary-General of the opposition grouping RHDP, who had called for demonstrations against the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire. Mr. Djédjé-Mady subsequently indicated that he had brought the issue to the UNOCI Human Rights Section, which was monitoring the proceedings of the tribunal.

F. Political engagement with the parties

70. My Special Representative continues to actively engage with all the Ivorian and international stakeholders. To that end, he works closely with the Facilitator and his Special Representative in Abidjan and regularly visits Ouagadougou for consultations with President Compaoré.

71. Since the current crisis surrounding the electoral process started in January, my Special Representative has intensified contacts with civil society, including religious leaders, to seek their views on the way forward and to solicit their contribution to ensuring that the population exercises restraint and patience as the efforts to find a solution to the impasse continue. He has also met the leaders of youth organizations to that end. Civil society organizations emphasized to the technical assessment mission that UNOCI should facilitate their full involvement in the mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreements, to ensure that the peace process is truly nationally owned.

72. As requested by some members of the Security Council, the technical assessment mission sought the views of many interlocutors on the question of apportioning responsibility and measures that could be taken to pressure the parties to make progress in the peace process. The opposition political parties gave a historical account of the evolution of the Ivorian crisis and the actions taken by the Security Council, expressing the view that the President and the ruling party had deliberately postponed the elections repeatedly since 2005 so as to prolong their stay in office. They recalled that, in its resolution 1721 (2006), the Security Council had endorsed the extension of President Gbagbo's term for a final period of 12 months, which had expired two years previously. They called on the Council to impose its targeted sanctions on senior officials of the ruling party who they said are responsible for impeding the peace process, and on those involved in serious violations of human rights and in inciting violence. The opposition leaders further argued that the international community should not treat Côte d'Ivoire as "a special case that should be allowed to move at its own pace". In that regard, Mr. Ouattara expressed the view that the Security Council should set October 2010, which will mark President Gbagbo's tenth year in office, as the deadline for holding the presidential election. If that deadline is not respected, in his view, the Council should demand that the President step down.

73. For his part, President Gbagbo also gave a detailed account of the history of the crisis, identifying the major concessions he had made in an effort to reunify the country and hold elections. Those concessions included accepting two Prime Ministers imposed by the international community (Seydou Diarra and Charles Konan Banny); issuing a decree that allowed Mr. Ouattara to become a candidate for the presidential election; giving the opposition parties majority representation in the Independent Electoral Commission and accepting a President of the Commission from the opposition; accepting Sagem as a technical operator and a United Nations role in certifying the electoral process because he wanted clean elections; and giving the post of Prime Minister to the head of a rebel movement that had attempted to remove him from office. The President and his party stressed that, despite those concessions, he was often unfairly accused of impeding the peace process and delaying the elections and, that in adopting previous resolutions that criticized him, the international community had conveniently disregarded the fact that he was elected in a free and fair election in 2000 and that the current crisis was created by an externally sponsored coup attempt, barely two years into his term of office, which had failed and developed into a rebellion. He added that, in another singular gesture in the hope of achieving reunification, he had reinstated the military officers who had joined the rebellion, who have retained their ranks and are now receiving salaries. The President stressed that he wanted elections as soon as possible, but clean and credible elections. He added that the Ouagadougou Agreement remains the appropriate framework for resolving the Ivorian crisis, expressed the view that 80 per cent of the crisis had been resolved, and requested that UNOCI should stay the course and continue to assist in the implementation of the remaining 20 per cent, in particular disarmament and reunification, so as to guarantee free and fair elections.

74. The Facilitator expressed the view that the Ouagadougou Agreement remained on track and that the parties were still committed to its full implementation. The Facilitator advised against taking punitive measures against the main political players, stressing that in the complex circumstances in Côte d'Ivoire progress is achieved in small steps, through gentle pressure, facilitation, dialogue and compromises. The Special Representative of the Facilitator added that the international community would fail if it did not recognize that reality. The Facilitator's view was shared by many international stakeholders, who warned that any punitive measures at this stage, including targeted sanctions, would further compound the already difficult situation, possibly divert focus from the priority tasks and have the opposite effect of hardening the stance of the targeted parties. The Facilitator and many of the international interlocutors advised that the United Nations should concentrate on helping the parties to implement, concomitantly, the remaining tasks related to elections, disarmament and reunification, while also assisting in the consolidation of peace.

G. Support issues

75. The uncertainty about the election date continues to make planning and the procurement of additional military and logistics air assets for the elections difficult. The existing logistical resources of UNOCI are being used to support the current electoral tasks, but more resources will be required to support the electoral process, once an election date is established.

H. Safety and security of personnel

76. The implementation of adequate risk mitigation measures continued to enable United Nations staff to proceed with their programmes and activities during the disturbances of February 2010. Violent crime, such as armed robberies and home invasions, continues to be a serious security threat for United Nations personnel. The situation is particularly serious in areas of the south and west where law enforcement agencies have limited means to address armed criminality. In the north, given the delicate nature of the processes to reunify the country, incidents involving armed groups cannot be excluded, which may affect the security of United Nations staff and activities. The implementation of operational security standards has reduced the exposure of the United Nations personnel to such criminality, but frequent power failures all around the country affect the implementation of some of the security measures.

V. Financial aspects

77. The General Assembly, by its resolution 63/289 of 30 June 2009, appropriated the amount of \$491.8 million for the maintenance of UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOCI beyond 31 May 2010, the cost of maintaining the Operation until 30 June 2010 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly. As at 31 March 2010, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to \$73.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1,725.7 million. Reimbursement to troop-contributing Governments for troop and formed police unit costs and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 28 February 2010 and December 2009, respectively.

VI. Observations and recommendations

78. Events in Côte d'Ivoire up to the end of 2009 had brought hope that the country was finally on a firm path towards resolving its protracted crisis. The Ouagadougou agreements had put in place a framework that enabled the parties to make notable progress — more so than any of the previous agreements. A general climate of stability had prevailed, freedom of movement had increased, and the identification and elections-related tasks were nearly completed. There was genuine expectation that Côte d'Ivoire was steadily moving forward and that elections would be held early in 2010.

79. I was therefore disappointed by the abrupt interruption of the electoral process in January and the resulting violence in February, which constituted a severe setback in the Ivorian peace process. The lack of progress in resolving the ensuing impasse, which has dragged on for almost five months, has led some to start questioning the relevance of the Ouagadougou framework. I would like, at the outset, to appeal to all Ivorian parties to avoid taking any actions that may reverse the significant progress they had made and risk plunging the country into renewed violence and instability.

80. Any unravelling of the Ouagadougou framework would be a cause for serious concern. There is currently no alternative framework to the Ouagadougou agreements. The reasons cited by the parties for the current impasse, including the issue of electoral fraud and the need to complete disarmament and reunify the country, do not in any way render the agreements irrelevant and are not insurmountable, if the necessary political will exists. Any suggestion to set aside the Ouagadougou agreements would be tantamount to moving the goal posts at the last minute and would unnecessarily prolong the crisis and the suffering of the Ivorian people. The Ouagadougou agreements should therefore continue to provide the framework for taking Côte d'Ivoire out of the crisis.

81. In the eight years since the outbreak of the crisis, perennial delays in implementing the various peace agreements have been a source of deep frustration for the Ivorian people. The events of February and March 2010 have demonstrated that the continuing failure to hold elections in Côte d'Ivoire constitutes a potential conflict trigger, in that it contributes to heightening tensions and hampers constitutional, political, economic and social normalization. The successive delays have also severely tested the patience of Côte d'Ivoire's international partners, who have invested significant levels of resources to assist the efforts to restore lasting peace and stability in the country. While delays emanating from genuine technical and practical challenges are understandable, interruptions from sheer lack of political will are not acceptable, particularly if they undermine the hard-won progress on delicate issues at the centre of the crisis. The Ivorian political leaders should therefore summon the courage to overcome narrow partisan and personal goals, put national interest first, and engage in genuine dialogue, under the auspices of the Facilitator, to resolve their differences.

82. The full ownership of the peace process by the Ivorian parties comes with an obligation to make it work. In addition to demonstrating the necessary political will, the Government will also be required to devote the requisite resources to support the implementation process. I would also urge the Facilitator and the signatories to the Ouagadougou agreements to actively engage with civil society and consider its involvement in the peace process so as to enhance genuine national ownership of the peace process.

83. The role of the Facilitator is critical. I commend him for the progress he has achieved so far and encourage him to persevere in his efforts. I was pleased to note that all parties informed the technical assessment mission that their confidence in the Facilitator remains undiminished. They must, however, support their words with deeds and extend their full cooperation to him in his efforts to convene the Cadre permanent de concertation in order to seek a way out of the current impasse. The international community too must speak with one voice and act in unison in its engagement with the Ivorian parties. The role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in this regard is particularly crucial. The Facilitator needs their full and united support now more than ever to give the faltering peace process a final push. I therefore welcome the statement issued on 3 May 2010 by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. I have noted, with concern, that funding for the office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator, provided by the Peacebuilding Fund, will be exhausted by the end of September. The annual budget of the office, to date, is \$2 million. It is essential to identify a steady source of funding to enable the office to continue to support the implementation of the remaining tasks under the Ouagadougou agreements.

84. I have carefully studied the findings of the technical assessment mission and the views collected from various interlocutors. They tell a story of a complex and delicate situation, of opportunities that have become elusive when they were within reach, of the suffering of ordinary people and the slow but steady decline of a country that once served as a pillar of stability and prosperity for the subregion. Given the disappointment arising from the abrupt interruption of an electoral process that was about to bear fruit, and the track record of perennial stalemates often emanating from political calculations for partisan gains, the temptation to yield to frustration and give up on Côte d'Ivoire is understandable. However, considering the distance Côte d'Ivoire has travelled and the remaining short mile to elections, it would be a let-down to the ordinary people of Côte d'Ivoire and the subregion, a reward to the spoilers, and a waste of the significant resources invested over the past eight years if the international community, in particular the United Nations, were to give up at this stage. One should also bear in mind that, although they are an essential step in the peace process, elections in themselves will not resolve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The continued support of the international community will be needed, beyond the elections, to help Côte d'Ivoire to complete its peace process and address the root causes of the crisis.

85. For these reasons, I recommend maintaining UNOCI with the current total overall strength of its military and police components, until the end of 2010, in order to give Côte d'Ivoire a chance to walk the final mile to the elections with the full support of the United Nations. The options considered by the technical assessment mission and recommendations on the rationalization and reconfiguration of UNOCI during this period are set out in paragraphs 97 to 100 below. Should this recommendation meet with the approval of the Security Council, the Secretariat would conduct a review of progress made in the peace process and submit further recommendations on the future of UNOCI before the end of the year.

86. I believe that the remaining seven months would provide ample time for the Ivorian parties to resolve their differences with the assistance of the Facilitator, demonstrate the sincerity of their commitment to the peace process, and implement the remaining tasks under the Ouagadougou Agreement, in particular those related to elections, disarmament, and all aspects of the reunification of the country. I share the view of the Facilitator that these crucial tasks are the priority processes at this stage and must be moved forward concomitantly. However, as explained in the findings of the technical assessment mission, the finalization of the voters list remains crucial. In this regard, I commend the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Independent Electoral Commission to find a way of breaking the impasse on the voters list. Furthermore, it is important to allow the Commission to do its work independently, with the support of the Prime Minister, the technical operators, the Facilitator, and UNOCI. I urge all parties to consider the approach set out in the joint statement issued on 2 May by the Prime Minister and the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, as a basis for reviving the stalled electoral process.

87. Should the Security Council approve the extension of the deployment of UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire until the end of this year, I would recommend that the mandate of the Operation be adjusted, to allow it to adapt to the new realities by focusing on helping the parties to implement the remaining tasks related to the priority processes identified above, namely, (1) disarmament and all aspects of the reunification of the country, and (2) elections. The Security Council, in its

resolution 1911 (2010), had already identified these as the priority tasks that UNOCI should support in order to complete the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreements. At the same time, it is essential that UNOCI support important tasks related to the consolidation of peace.

88. With regard to the electoral process, I would like to recall that the provisional list of voters was the outcome of a credible process, conducted on the basis of modalities that were agreed upon by all parties. All efforts should therefore be made to restore confidence in the list in a way that consolidates the achievements already made. I recommend that UNOCI continue to provide technical and logistical support to enable the Independent Electoral Commission to complete the following remaining tasks: relaunching the interrupted appeals process; distributing the provisional and final voters lists; sensitizing the media; distributing identity cards and voters cards; and distributing and securing sensitive electoral material, including ballot papers. Since the issuance of the identity cards affects progress towards completing the other priority processes, it is essential to distribute these cards expeditiously, with the assistance of UNOCI, once the voters list is finalized.

89. Cognizant of the dual role of UNOCI emanating from the certification mandate of my Special Representative and its current mandate to provide technical and logistical support for the electoral process, I recommend that the Electoral Assistance Division of UNOCI should actively participate in the ongoing efforts, led by the Prime Minister, to break the impasse on the electoral list by providing technical advice, while the UNOCI certification cell should participate as an observer, to enable my Special Representative to take into account the manner in which this delicate matter is resolved when he certifies the preparation of the final voters list. UNOCI will step up its public information campaign to further sensitize the population and the parties on the certification process.

90. I was pleased to note that the Prime Minister assured the technical assessment mission that the question whether disarmament and reunification of the country should come before the elections is a non-issue. I therefore urge the Forces nouvelles to match those words with action and launch the cantonment of forces in Korhogo, followed by other designated sites, without delay. This must, however, be coordinated with the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and UNOCI should assist the Government in planning and coordinating what remains a fractured process. I recommend that UNOCI provide continued advice to the national partners in charge of all aspects of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and dismantling of militias processes, contribute to the refurbishment of the barracks at the four cantonment sites and support the cantonment process; participate in the arrangement for the secure storage of weapons; and continue to provide microprojects for demobilized combatants. The latter is of particular importance and I remain concerned about the lack of reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants and militias, which poses a real threat to the security and consolidation of peace in Côte d'Ivoire. I also call on international partners to provide additional funding for microprojects or other reinsertion and reintegration activities, without which stability is likely to prove elusive, even beyond the elections. At the same time, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire must provide the required resources for the sustainment of cantoned combatants and the payment of allowances for demobilized combatants and militia. It is important to stress that the disarmament and dismantling of militias process must make progress at the same time as disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration progresses in order to avoid pretexts for stalling the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and ultimately, elections. I recommend in this regard that UNOCI assist the national authorities in the collection and destruction of the militias' weapons.

91. In addition, as requested by the Chief of Staff of the Forces nouvelles, and in keeping with the provisions of Ouagadougou IV, I recommend that UNOCI contribute to the basic training of the 5,000 Forces nouvelles personnel who are to be cantoned to prepare for their integration into the national army. Such training should include sensitization on human rights and international humanitarian law. Mindful of the amnesty provisions of the Ouagadougou Agreement, UNOCI should encourage the Forces nouvelles and the Government to vet all personnel that will form part of the new national army. At the same time, a holistic approach to security sector reform is essential for the long-term sustainability of the security architecture in the country. The United Nations stands ready to support Côte d'Ivoire in this process, in close coordination with the African Union and ECOWAS.

92. Regarding the restoration of State authority throughout the country, I fully share the view that the continuation of a parallel administration, economy and security apparatus in the north, three years after the integration of the Forces nouvelles into the Government, is unacceptable. The Security Council should demand the immediate handover of control over the economy and revenues in the north to the Government. For its part, the Government has the responsibility to ensure the delivery of social services to the population as State authority is restored. The upcoming fiftieth anniversary of Côte d'Ivoire's independence is a galvanizing event for achieving the effective reunification of the country in all its aspects without further delay.

93. I recommend that UNOCI and the United Nations system play a more active role in support of the effective restoration of State authority, including the resumption of State functions. To this end, UNOCI should strengthen its support in key areas, particularly administration and the rule of law, and continue to play a key role in the development, coordination and implementation of projects in the justice and corrections sectors. Meanwhile, the United Nations system should urgently strengthen efforts to increase the planning and administrative capacities of the regional presences of key line ministries in areas where the reach of the State remains limited. I also recommend the deployment of up to eight seconded Customs officers, with a corresponding reduction in the military observers strength, keeping the overall uniformed personnel strength of UNOCI unchanged. The seconded Customs officers would provide advice and support to the redeployed national Customs officials in the north. In addition, I recommend the deployment of the appropriate number of civilian public finance experts, to monitor progress in the economic reunification of the country. Both the Customs and public finance experts would operate, as necessary, in mixed mobile teams with UNOCI military observers and strengthen the UNOCI embargo cell.

94. With respect to the Integrated Command Centre, I recommend that UNOCI provide it with technical advice and logistical support to increase its ability to implement its mandate. The Government, meanwhile, should assume its responsibility to fully support the Integrated Command Centre, including with regard to financing, logistics, communications and non-lethal crowd control equipment. In that context, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) may

wish to consider an exemption to the arms embargo allowing the Government to import riot control gear for relevant law enforcement institutions to avoid the use of long weapons and live ammunition in situations of civil unrest.

95. I was deeply disturbed by the violence that erupted in February in various parts of the country, and am concerned about the evolving dangerous security situation in the country. All parties have a responsibility to contribute to the creation of a secure climate for the elections. For its part, UNOCI should continue to work with Licorne, the Integrated Command Centre and other relevant national authorities to implement the agreed security plan for the elections.

96. I have noted the complexities facing UNOCI and the United Nations country team in Côte d'Ivoire with regard to the implementation of their protection of civilians responsibilities. Ensuring a safe and secure environment, including protecting civilians and securing the country's borders, is primarily the responsibility of the Ivorian authorities. I trust that UNOCI and the Security Council will continue to monitor closely the conduct of the Government and other Ivorian stakeholders in this important area. At the same time, I am concerned about the limited capacity of the relevant national security institutions to protect civilians, particularly in those areas where the law enforcement authorities still lack adequate manpower and means. In keeping with its mandate as set out in paragraph 2 (f) of Security Council resolution 1739 (2007), UNOCI will continue to strengthen its efforts to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, with particular attention to those specific locations. In addition, UNOCI and the United Nations country team will continue to develop a comprehensive protection of civilians strategy, in accordance with paragraph 24 of Council resolution 1894 (2009), which will cover modalities to assess current and potential threats, options for crisis response, including the UNOCI protection mandate, and risk mitigation measures. UNOCI and the United Nations country team will ensure the designation of dedicated capacity to this end and improved coordination within the system, and with key stakeholders, including humanitarian partners. Protection of civilians is a major contribution to peace consolidation and is clearly not a security issue alone. It has also a socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights dimension, which the United Nations system will address in a holistic manner together with the Government and other stakeholders.

97. The technical assessment mission considered the options developed earlier by my Special Representative regarding the reconfiguration of UNOCI. These included (1) strengthening the UNOCI mandate to organize elections; (2) maintaining the status quo; (3) rationalizing the Operation's mandate and configuration; and (4) withdrawing the Operation. On the basis of its findings, the mission focused on option (3). In this regard, the recommended tasks for UNOCI, set out in this section, would achieve the goal of rationalizing the mandate. As indicated in paragraph 85 above, the current combined strength of the UNOCI uniformed personnel would be maintained until the end of 2010. With regard to the reconfiguration of the Operation, the technical assessment mission explored two options. The first option would adjust the current troop deployment so as to increase troop concentrations in identified high-risk areas. One infantry company currently located in Dabakala would also be redeployed to reinforce the sector reserve located at Bouaké, and the force reserve battalion would be restructured to deploy an additional combat platoon. This adjustment could be achieved relatively quickly. In addition, the strength of the military and police components would be rebalanced by using existing headroom in

the military component to add 50 police officers, to reinforce the existing formed police units, in view of the anticipated increase in civil disturbances and the protection demands.

98. In the second option, UNOCI would increase troop presence where cantonment sites are to be located, while maintaining an observation presence in other areas. Rebalancing of the military and police would be carried out within the current authorized strength, allowing the deployment of one additional formed police unit, comprising 140 officers. An additional infantry company would be deployed to reinforce Sector Abidjan. An additional aviation unit will be required to provide air mobility to the reserves and police units throughout the mission area. This rebalancing would be achieved by repatriating an equivalent number of troops from elsewhere in the mission area.

99. After careful reflection, I recommend that the Security Council endorse the first option maintaining the current combined total authorized strength at 8,650 personnel, with an overall military strength of 7,392, consisting of 7,200 troops and 192 military observers; an overall police strength of 1,250, consisting of 450 individual police officers and six formed police units for a total of 800 officers; and 8 seconded Customs officers. This option can be achieved rapidly, addresses the threat of civil disturbances and strengthens the reserve troops in strife-prone sectors.

100. Unrest before, during and after the elections remains a real threat. I therefore reiterate my earlier recommendation that UNOCI be strengthened for a period of at least three months prior to, and three months after, the elections. In lieu of the battalion from Burkina Faso, which is no longer an option, as I indicated earlier, it will be necessary to reinforce the UNOCI uniformed personnel with up to a total of 500 troops and police by increasing the operational elements of existing formed police units, and two additional infantry companies, with additional aviation elements. The Secretariat will keep the Security Council apprised of developments and technical analysis, as requested.

101. It is clear that the country remains a tinderbox that could ignite easily if the root causes of the conflict remain unaddressed. The welfare of the population continues to deteriorate, owing to deepening poverty, lack of much-needed employment, and minimal access to basic social services, and may fuel civil unrest. UNOCI will intensify its collaboration with the United Nations country team to support peace consolidation in all its aspects and encourage the Government to seek sustainable solutions to land issues; strengthen its efforts to build the capacity of Ivorian civil society to participate meaningfully in the peace process; and support a process of national dialogue, with particular emphasis on the participation of women and young people.

102. I remain concerned about continuing reports of impunity for widespread human rights violations, particularly sexual and gender-based violence including against children, and that national forces perpetrated violations during the violence in February. I therefore call upon the Ivorian authorities to urgently take concrete measures to fight impunity for human rights violations, including by adopting the national strategy to combat sexual violence, with increased support from UNOCI and the United Nations country team. UNOCI will continue to monitor and report on the human rights situation, including as called for in Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), bringing to the Council's attention all individuals identified as perpetrators of serious human rights violations and instigators of

political violence, including the leaders of partisan youth movements. Biannual public reports on violations of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire and other relevant thematic reports will be issued as appropriate. In addition, UNOCI will strengthen its capacity to monitor and report on sexual violence pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1882 (2009) and 1888 (2009).

103. The negative role of the media, which fans political tensions and incites violence in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the lack of access by all parties to the State media are unacceptable. I encourage the Security Council to take a strong stance on this issue, including through the imposition of targeted sanctions against the concerned media institutions. The Council should also demand equal access by all parties to the State media. UNOCI will continue to monitor developments in the Ivorian media and share its findings, as appropriate, with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004).

104. I took particular note of the different views of various stakeholders regarding punitive measures against political actors who obstruct the peace process. The Ivorian crisis is complex, and it is important to recognize that some who may be accused of delaying the process now may have made concessions and facilitated major progress at other stages. In addition, progress has always been achieved in small, painstaking steps through dialogue and compromises among the parties. I therefore agree with the Facilitator that punitive measures may be counterproductive and urge the Council to encourage dialogue and political compromises.

105. The technical assessment mission reviewed, as the Security Council requested, the benchmarks that I recommended in paragraph 47 of my report of 8 January 2009 (S/2009/21) and that the Council subsequently endorsed in its resolution 1865 (2009). They are designed to measure progress in the implementation of critical tasks in the Ouagadougou agreements, and continue to provide a useful framework to measure achievements in that regard. A full assessment of the status of their implementation has been provided in the body of this report. UNOCI will continue to keep the benchmarks and the indicators of achievement under review and provide an update on progress made in my next report to the Security Council.

106. UNOCI and the United Nations country team will also review the indicators of achievement to ensure that the priorities I have identified progress concomitantly. For this to succeed, UNOCI and the country team will strengthen their analytical and strategic planning capacities within the context of the Integrated Strategic Framework. I also call upon donors to increase their support to vital peace consolidation activities, which cannot proceed without adequate resources.

107. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire and all UNOCI military, police and civilian personnel for their continuing commitment to supporting the peace process. I am also grateful to the Facilitator of the Ivorian peace process, President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, for his tireless facilitation efforts. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all troop- and police-contributing countries, ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, humanitarian organizations and multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as international and local non-governmental organizations, for their important contributions to the return of peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire.

Annex

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and police strength as at 12 May 2010

Country	Military component			Police components		
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Civilian police
Argentina						3
Bangladesh	14	11	2 069	2 094	250	
Benin	6	6	420	432		53
Bolivia	3			3		
Brazil	4	3		7		
Burundi						23
Cameroon						50
Canada						4
Central Africa Republic						8
Chad	3	1		4		28
China	4			4		
Djibouti						18
Democratic Republic of the Congo						11
Ecuador	2			2		
Egypt		1	175	176		4
El Salvador	3			3		
Ethiopia	2			2		
France	1	8		9		11
Gambia	3			3		
Ghana	6	8	532	546		15
Guatemala	5			5		
Guinea	3			3		
India	7			7		
Ireland	3			3		
Jordan	7	12	1 046	1 065	374	13
Morocco		3	723	726		
Namibia	2			2		
Nepal	3	1		4		
Niger	5	4	382	391		62
Nigeria	5			5		
Pakistan	11	11	1 127	1 149	125	1
Paraguay	7	2		9		
Peru	3			3		

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>			<i>Police components</i>		
	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>
Philippines	4	3		7		
Poland	5			5		
Republic of Korea	2			2		
Republic of Moldova	4			4		
Romania	7			7		
Russian Federation	11			11		
Senegal	11	6	320	337		40
Serbia	3			3		
Switzerland						4
Togo	7	6	309	322		25
Tunisia	7	4		11		
Turkey						18
Uganda	4	2		6		
Ukraine						4
United Republic of Tanzania	1	2		3		
Uruguay	2			2		3
Yemen	8	1		9		4
Zambia	2			2		
Zimbabwe	3			3		
Total	193	95	7 103	7 391 (female 113)	749	402 (female 16)

