DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In August, the Chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl (Switzerland), is scheduled to brief Council members in closed consultations on the 90-day report regarding the Committee’s work.
Key Recent Developments
The DPRK has continued to build closer ties with Russia in recent months. On 19 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, where the two leaders signed a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. According to media reports, the treaty refers to several measures intended to boost relations between the DRPK and Russia, including exchanges and joint research in science and technology, cooperation at the UN and other international organisations, and joint actions to strengthen defence capabilities. Most notably, the treaty reportedly provides that “in case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and [Russia]”.
Following the summit, Kim characterised the treaty as elevating relations between the DPRK and Russia to a “new high level of alliance”, while Putin thanked the DPRK for taking an “objective and balanced stance on Ukraine” and understanding “the true original causes of this crisis”. Putin also criticised the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime and called for it to be revised. In remarks delivered to the press on 21 June, Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised that the sanctions had been approved by the Council and said that “any relationship that any country has with [the] DPRK, including the Russian Federation, must entirely abide by those sanctions”.
On 28 June, the Council convened for an open briefing on the DPRK. The meeting was requested by France, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the US to discuss “unlawful arms transfers from the DPRK”. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu and Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research Jonah Leff briefed.
The open briefing took place three months after Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee for another year, until 30 April 2025. (For more information, see our 22 March What’s in Blue story.) In a statement delivered on behalf of 50 member states and the European Union on 1 May, the day after the Panel’s mandate expired, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield (US) criticised Russia’s veto and emphasised the need to “consider how to continue access to this kind of objective, independent analysis in order to address the DPRK’s unlawful WMD and ballistic missile advancements”.
Since the expiration of the Panel’s mandate, reports have continued to emerge regarding the DPRK’s efforts to evade UN sanctions and mitigate their effects. On 3 May, the White House announced that during March Russia shipped refined petroleum to the DPRK at levels that appear to violate a cap imposed by the 1718 sanctions regime. In mid-May, several former members of the Panel reportedly provided an unfinished report to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee containing evidence suggesting that the DPRK laundered $147.5 million through a virtual currency platform in March.
The DPRK has continued to test its weapons systems and military technology in recent months. On 27 May, the DPRK announced that its latest attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite had been unsuccessful. DPRK state media reported that “the launch of the new satellite carrier rocket failed when it exploded in mid-air during the flight of the first stage” and claimed that the rocket used in the launch had utilised a new “liquid oxygen and petroleum engine.” The Council convened for an open briefing to discuss the failed launch on 31 May following a request from France, Japan, Malta, the ROK, the UK, and the US. Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific Mohamed Khaled Khiari briefed. The DPRK has also recently conducted several missile tests, including the 1 July launch of a ballistic missile that DPRK state media claimed was capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead.
On 12 June, the Council convened for an open briefing on the human rights situation in the DPRK at the request of Japan, the ROK, the UK, and the US. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK Elizabeth Salmón, and DPRK refugee Gumhyok Kim briefed. (For more information, see our 11 June What’s in Blue story.)
From 13 to 16 July, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Qu Dongyu visited the DPRK. Qu’s trip marked the first occasion that a UN official has travelled to the DPRK since the country partially reopened its borders in August 2023.
Human Rights-related Developments
On 16 July, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report on forced labour in the DPRK. Among other matters, the report concludes that people in the DPRK are controlled and exploited through an extensive and multi-layered system of forced labour that is directed towards the interests of the state and institutionalised through various means, including prisons, schools, compulsory state-allocated employment, and overseas work.
Key Issues and Options
The expiration of the Panel’s mandate has created a significant issue for the Council. While the Council could choose to adopt a resolution requesting that the Secretary-General reconstitute the Panel, this appears unlikely given the prevailing dynamics among Council members.
Those members who support independent oversight of the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime could choose to push for the General Assembly to establish a mechanism comparable to the Panel. This mechanism could be tasked with performing functions similar to those assigned to the Panel, including analysing information regarding the implementation of the 1718 sanctions regime, preparing reports, and making appropriate recommendations. These members could also choose to establish a body to monitor the 1718 DPRK regime outside UN fora.
Council Dynamics
The Council is deeply divided over the DPRK. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded countries, including Japan and the ROK, support using sanctions to manage the threat posed by the DPRK and often call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its weapons programmes, while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some of these members also call for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened it by blocking Council action on the file.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US for heightening tensions and accuse it of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have also contended that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation and continue to express their support for a draft resolution circulated by China in October 2021 that would provide sanctions relief to the DPRK if adopted.
The divisions between Council members were evident during the negotiations of the US draft resolution on the Panel’s mandate. In a statement delivered before the vote on this draft, Russia claimed that the Panel had ceased to carry out its obligations and said that the sanctions regime no longer reflects realities on the ground, imposes a heavy burden on the population of the DPRK, and has failed to achieve the international community’s stated aims. It further argued that a provision requiring an annual review of the regime was needed to address these issues. China expressed support for an annual review of the regime and called on the Council to consider the draft resolution it circulated in October 2021.
Other Council members strongly criticised Russia’s veto, arguing that it undermines the global non-proliferation regime and emboldens the DPRK in its attempts to evade sanctions. Several members—including France, Japan, the ROK, the UK, and the US—linked the veto to Russia’s alleged purchase of arms from the DPRK. Some of these members emphasised that the 1718 regime remained in place and said that they would continue efforts to monitor and enforce its provisions.
It appears that some Council members are currently considering whether and how to establish an alternative to the Panel, including outside the Council. While some members are open to this idea, other members are apparently concerned about possible unforeseen implications and the precedent that such a mechanism would create.
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
