South Sudan
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by consultations, to discuss the situation in South Sudan. Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom is anticipated to brief on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on South Sudan, circulated to Council members on 29 July, and developments in the country.
The mandate of UNMISS expires on 30 April 2025.
Key Recent Developments
On 9 May, high-level mediation talks (known as the Tumaini initiative) between the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) and the non-signatories to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), facilitated by Kenya, commenced in Nairobi. Kenyan President William Ruto appointed former Kenyan army commander Lazarus Sumbeiywo as the chief mediator for the South Sudanese peace process.
On 15 July, the parties reportedly reached agreements on eight protocols under the Tumaini initiative, including issues related to humanitarian access and support; trust- and confidence-building measures; a permanent ceasefire; security arrangements, and reforms; and land disputes. The agreement apparently provides for an inclusive governance structure among the government, opposition groups, and other stakeholders, covering areas such as executive roles, legislature, security, constitutional processes, and elections management. However, Riek Machar, South Sudan’s first Vice President and the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLM-IO), reportedly decided to withdraw from the talks, arguing that the agreed protocols fail to recognise the revitalised agreement and establish alternative institutions to replace or run in parallel with those in the revitalised agreement. He asserted that the Tumaini Initiative was only supposed to be a mediation forum for the parties to agree on a document that could serve as an annex to the revitalised agreement, thereby bringing the non-signatories into the fold, and not a stand-alone agreement.
On 3 July, South Sudan’s Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) passed the controversial National Security Act 2014 (Amendment) Bill 2024, which reportedly grants the National Security Service broad powers to arrest and detain without a warrant individuals suspected of a crime, particularly “under emergency circumstances” and in instances of “crimes against the state”. The SPLM-IO rejected the legislation, saying that it goes against the spirit of the revitalised agreement and undermines security sector reforms. The hold-out groups participating in the Tumaini initiative also expressed their opposition to the legislation and called for reconstituting the National Security Service into a civilian intelligence service with the mandate to gather intelligence without powers of arrest, detention, and interference in political processes. In a 10 July joint statement, the embassies of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US, and the EU expressed grave concern about the passage of this legislation, noting that it constituted a “significant step away from the opening of political and civic space, which is a prerequisite for genuine and peaceful elections to take place”.
In a 5 July press release, the National Elections Commission (NEC) announced that the much-awaited national elections will be held on 22 December. However, South Sudan’s information minister said the next day (6 July) that the presidency will decide the election date based on the outcome of the Tumaini initiative talks. On 7 July, the SPLM-IO political bureau adopted a resolution rejecting the proposed date. It argued that the NEC failed to take into consideration the “pre-requisites” for holding the elections, including the transitional security arrangements and the drafting of the permanent constitution. In an 11 July joint press release, the AU Mission in South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and UNMISS urged the parties to the R-ARCSS to provide clarity on the electoral roadmap and reach consensus on the way forward.
The humanitarian situation in the country remains difficult, with nearly nine million people—almost 76 percent of the country’s population—in need of humanitarian assistance and 7.1 million people facing high levels of food insecurity. At the same time, recent months have witnessed an increase in incidents that impeded humanitarian access. According to a 6 June humanitarian access snapshot by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 47 incidents related to humanitarian access restrictions were reported in May, 23 of which involved violence against humanitarian personnel and assets. Meanwhile, other incidents were attributed to bureaucratic impediments and operational interference.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 10 July press release, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan said that the National Security Act 2014 (Amendment) Bill 2024 would “entrench arbitrary detention and further repression by South Sudan’s National Security Service”. Yasmin Sooka, the Chair of the Commission, called for the bill to be returned to the legislators to make amendments “that align with the government’s commitment to scrap this institution’s arrest powers, which are systematically abused and unlawful.”
On 17 July, the UNMISS Human Rights Division released its quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians (covering January to March), which reported that widespread attacks against civilians persist across South Sudan, driven primarily by subnational armed violence. During the reporting period, the brief documented 240 incidents of violence affecting 913 civilians. In comparison to the previous quarter (October to December 2023), the brief reported an eight percent increase in the number of documented violent incidents (from 223 to 240) and a six percent increase in the number of victims documented (from 862 to 913).
Key Issues and Options
An ongoing concern for the Council is the significant political and security challenges in South Sudan stemming from the delays in implementing the R-ARCSS. A key issue in this regard is what the Council can do to encourage the parties to make progress towards implementing the outstanding tasks (including finalising transitional security arrangements, drafting a new constitution, and establishing an election dispute resolution mechanism) and reach consensus on the modalities for holding elections, expected to take place in December. Looking ahead to the general elections, several members may reiterate their call for these to be peaceful, transparent, inclusive, and credible. They may also continue to encourage South Sudanese authorities to promote free civic space and call on all parties to engage in dialogue and seek consensus to resolve any election-related disputes.
Council members might be keen to follow up on the progress of the inter-party dialogue and the Tumaini initiative mediation talks.
Ahead of the election period, Council members could consider a visiting mission to South Sudan to assess the situation on the ground and engage with the various parties to the R-ARCSS. (The last Council visiting mission to South Sudan was in 2019.)
An additional key issue for Council members is the humanitarian and food security situations. An option would be to seek regular briefings on these matters from OCHA.
The impact of the conflict in neighbouring Sudan on the humanitarian, political, and security situations in South Sudan remains a matter of concern for Council members. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee, dated 29 April, said that several senior South Sudanese government officials have confirmed the participation of “mercenaries” of South Sudanese origin in the Sudan conflict and have cautioned that this may trigger further illicit movement of firearms across the Sudan-South Sudan border. Reports have also suggested that the Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese paramilitary group and one of the warring parties in the Sudan conflict, had secured a supply route from South Sudan for fuel.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members share similar concerns about the delays in implementing the R-ARCSS, the ongoing sub-national and intercommunal violence, and the economic and humanitarian crises in South Sudan. There are, however, differences in tone in members’ statements. Some members, such as the US, are more critical than others about what they perceive to be the South Sudanese government’s lack of political will to implement the R-ARCSS. During the 5 March Council briefing on the situation in South Sudan, the US said that in the absence of urgent action from the South Sudanese government, “allocating further financial resources for election preparations…sends a wrong message”. It added that future funding for the elections must be accompanied by a renewed push on the South Sudanese peace process and improved humanitarian access.
On the other hand, Council members such as China, Russia, and the members of the “A3 plus one” (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) are less critical of the government. In their statements, these members often highlight the progress the South Sudanese government has made amidst the country’s severe challenges, including the dire humanitarian situation, intercommunal violence, and the economic crisis. These members advocate for enhanced international financial support to assist South Sudan in its political transition and strengthen its capacity.
The US is the penholder on South Sudan, and Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone) chairs the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 26 February 2024S/2024/188 | This was the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on South Sudan. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 8 April 2024S/2024/297 | This letter transmitted the assessment regarding South Sudan’s election preparedness and outstanding tasks related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 26 April 2024S/2024/343 | The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee submitted pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023). |
| 15 January 2024S/2024/65 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, submitted pursuant to resolution 2676. |
