In Hindsight: The Security Council and Regional Arrangements
The contours of the relationship between the UN Security Council and “regional arrangements and agencies” have long been the subject of debate.[1] This debate has assumed renewed significance following the publication of A New Agenda for Peace, a July 2023 policy brief that sets out UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ vision for an effective multilateral security system. The brief argues that robust regional frameworks and organisations that have strong partnerships with the UN are necessary for managing growing competition among member states and the increasingly transnational threats facing the international community.[2]
Among the many recommendations directed towards or involving regional arrangements, Guterres suggests that the UN, regional organisations, and their respective member states should “operationalise rapid responses to emerging crises through active diplomatic efforts” and calls for repairing regional security architectures where they are in danger of collapsing; building them where they do not exist; and enhancing them where they can be further developed.[3]
Addressing the role of regional organisations in the context of peace operations, the brief argues that “peace operations must be significantly more integrated and should leverage the full range of civilian capacities and expertise across the [UN] system and its partners, as part of a system of networked multilateralism and strengthened partnerships.”[4] UN support for African peace support operations receives particular attention. The brief calls for a new generation of peace enforcement missions and counter-terrorism operations in Africa, led by African partners with a Council mandate under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter and guaranteed funding from member states’ assessed contributions to the UN. It also recommends systematic consideration of requests made by the AU and subregional organisations for the provision of support to peace support operations.[5]
These recommendations implicitly acknowledge the increased involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War period. This has been partly caused by some regions’ preference for regional solutions, particularly in Africa; a desire to share the burden of conflict management; and growing awareness by the Council and member states that regional arrangements offer useful strategic flexibility when managing or responding to a crisis, among other matters. But the turn to regional actors has not always been the result of an overarching strategy. It has more often come about as a pragmatic response to the particular circumstances of a given case, usually driven by political considerations.
The forthcoming SCR research report examines the legal framework governing the relationship between the Council and regional arrangements, as well as past models of cooperation, and concludes with observations regarding the issues that have arisen in the past.
It delves deeply into Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, offering an interpretation drawn from an analysis of practice and the text. Chapter VIII is relatively short, comprising only three articles. The first of these, Article 52, deals primarily with the peaceful settlement of disputes by regional arrangements. Article 53 governs regional enforcement action, while Article 54 provides that the Council must be kept fully informed of the activities of regional arrangements relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Cooperation between the Council and regional arrangements can take many forms. Most often, it arises in the context of peace operations. The report therefore focuses primarily on models of cooperation that involved peace operations. The models considered are set out in the table below. Overall, the examples chosen demonstrate that cooperation between regional arrangements and the Council, as well as the UN more broadly, has generally produced mixed results. While there have been successes, there have also been many challenges, and the overall relationship has not always been smooth. The problems that have arisen raise questions relating to the appropriate level of Council oversight, managing strategic disagreements, the structures for effective operational coordination, and adequate resourcing, among other matters.
Our report further explores mandating decisions, the importance of Council unity and coordinated regional diplomacy, Council oversight of regional efforts to peacefully settle disputes, the benefits of political alignment, re-hatting, doctrinal differences, and the question of complementarity and comparative advantage.
In light of this review, the report makes the following observations:
- When the Council opts for cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements, it is essential for it to have a clear understanding of the role that each organisation will play, its capacity to do so, and the proposed relationship among the different actors. Processes and structures that facilitate exchanges—such as interactive discussions between the Council and its counterparts in regional arrangements, joint assessments, and regular desk-to-desk meetings geared towards outcomes—can contribute to better alignment.
- The lack of a clear political strategy can cause problems for peace operations premised on cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements. As A New Agenda for Peace notes, the primacy of politics “remains a central tenet of peace operations”.
- Disagreements over strategy between the UN and regional arrangements can be hard to avoid, however, given the often diverging viewpoints of the principal actors. Coming at the onset of a crisis, this can lead to delays while the situation deteriorates; later, it can complicate implementation. It will be essential to streamline the mandate authorisation process for AU-led peace support operations outlined in resolution 2719 and clarify contentious issues covered in the resolution, including financial burden-sharing and joint planning.[6]
- Where the UN and regional arrangements are deployed in parallel, a lack of adequate coordination can inhibit the development and maintenance of a coherent overall strategy in respect of international engagement, and can also obfuscate accountability among organisations.
- Parallel leadership structures (for example, where control over the military and political aspects of a mission is divided between different organisations) will be a drag on responsiveness, a problem in complex security environments.
- Council unity can play an important role in facilitating effective cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements. Successful collaboration can also be bolstered by coordinated diplomacy involving regional actors that is consistent with the overall strategy being pursued by the Council. Conversely, divisions among Council members can prevent the Council from taking action and communicating clear signals to the parties.
- Regional efforts to peacefully settle disputes can be hampered by constraints such as divisions among its members, its organisational culture and structure, and its decision-making processes.
Where regional efforts are faltering, the Council’s oversight role and its powers to facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes need to come to the fore. However, members have sometimes used the involvement of a regional arrangement to argue for Council inaction.
- Where a peace operation is deployed, political alignment with the host state is particularly important, not least in circumstances where the UN is working with a regional arrangement. A compact signed by relevant actors outlining the commitments they have made and their roles, similar to the type recommended in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, could be helpful. Where the host state is intent on obstructing the mission, however, processes intended to ease disagreements may find limited success.
- Regional arrangements often face resource constraints far greater than those experienced by UN peace operations. Authorising regional peace operations without taking timely steps for their financial and logistical support will cause delays.
- Troop re-hatting processes are difficult and require careful planning, adequate time, and thorough training. Procedures that screen out troops involved with prior human rights violations are critically important. Differences in equipment and interoperability issues can be particularly problematic during a re-hatting process. Periods of planned overlap can help to minimise difficulties during re-hatting and lead to a smoother transition.
- Doctrinal differences regarding peacekeeping operations—over the use of force, for example—can lead to strategic differences between the UN and its regional partners that complicate efforts to collaborate. They can also cause operational problems, particularly where missions with differing bureaucratic arrangements, needs, and expectations are mandated to work closely together.
The examples considered in our report highlight some of the comparative advantages enjoyed by the UN and its regional partners. Regional actors have, for example, at times been able to deploy quickly and shown a willingness to undertake peace enforcement actions requiring a robust mandate. The UN, on the other hand, has shown that it can boost flagging regional peace operations and provide logistical support to regional actors.
But experience also shows that the UN and its regional partners may fall short of their aims, impeded by resource constraints and political disagreements. And the UN will tend to become closely associated with regional arrangements that deploy in parallel—which can be problematic where those regional arrangements are unpopular among local populations.
All in all, is the turn to regional organisations a good idea? There are advantages and disadvantages to greater regional involvement. But the role for regional arrangements in efforts to maintain international peace and security seems likely to grow, as part of the trend toward regionalisation and the current emphasis on developing a system of networked multilateralism, which is reflected in the many references to regional arrangements in the current draft of the Pact for the Future.
Table of examples considered in SCR’s forthcoming research report.
| No. | Model | Example | Year |
| 1. | Expressing support for a joint UN/regional arrangement peace operation | MICIVIH (Haiti) | 1993 |
| 2. | Deploying a UN peace operation in parallel with a regional peace operation | UNOMIL (Liberia) | 1993 |
| 3. | Utilising regional arrangements to establish a transitional administration | UNMIK (Kosovo) | 1999 |
| 4. | Authorising a predominantly regional multinational force with regional leadership to support a UN peace operation | INTERFET (Timor-Leste) | 1999 |
| 5. | Authorising a UN peace operation that took over from a regional peace operation | UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) | 1999 |
| 6. | Utilising a regional arrangement to support a UN peace operation | MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad (Chad) | 2007 |
| 7. | Deploying a hybrid UN/regional arrangement peace operation | UNAMID (Sudan) | 2007 |
| 8. | Establishing a UN support office to provide logistical support to a regional peace operation | UNSOA (Somalia) | 2009 |
| 9. | Authorising a regional arrangement to use force | NATO (Libya) | 2011 |
| 10. | Authorising a regional force to work within a UN peace operation | MONUSCO and the FIB (DRC) | 2013 |
| 11. | Authorising the deployment of a regional peace operation | MISCA (CAR) | 2013 |
| Re-hatting a regional peace operation into a UN peace operation | AFISMA and MINUSMA (Mali) | 2013 | |
| 13. | Expressing support for a regional peace enforcement operation | ECOMIG (The Gambia) | 2017 |
| 14. | Directing a UN peace operation to provide support to a regional peace operation | MINUSMA and FC-G5S (Mali) | 2017 |
| 15. | Expressing support for regional efforts to resolve a dispute peacefully | ASEAN (Myanmar) | 2021 |
[1] In September, Security Council Report will publish a research report on the relationship between the Security Council and regional arrangements. This In Hindsight excerpts the executive summary. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter refers to “regional arrangements and agencies” rather than regional organisations. Both our report and this In Hindsight use the term regional arrangements, except where paraphrasing. The term “regional arrangements” captures both traditional regional organisations and less formal arrangements.
[2] Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace, UN Doc EOSG/2023/9 (July 2023) 12.
[3] Ibid 18.
[4] Ibid 24. Emphasis added.
[5] On 21 December 2023, just over five months after A New Agenda for Peace was published, the Council adopted resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations. Pursuant to resolution 2719, the Council agreed to consider on a case-by-case basis requests from the AU Peace and Security Council seeking authorisation for access to UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations. This resolution is considered in further detail below. Ibid 26.
[6] Eugene Chen, ‘Next Steps on the Financing of African Peace Support Operations: Unpacking Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)’ (February 2024) <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/next-steps-on-the-financing-of-african-peace-support-operations/>.
