Sudan
Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo), which expires on 12 September.
The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2025.
Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to brief the Council on the committee’s work.
Key Recent Developments
The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which began in April 2023, has triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Sudan, including significant civilian casualties, mass displacement, severe food and water shortages, and the collapse of healthcare and essential services. As at 23 August, more than 20,000 people had been killed since the onset of the conflict, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a non-governmental organisation that collects conflict-related data. Some estimates suggest, however, that the number of casualties may be significantly higher. The war has displaced approximately 10.3 million people, 2.2 million of whom have sought refuge in Sudan’s neighbouring countries—the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, and Uganda—making it the world’s largest displacement crisis. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our June 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Council members have been closely following the food insecurity situation in Sudan. On 6 August, the Council held an open briefing on the 1 August report of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC). The report determined that famine conditions were present in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) located near El Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, which houses approximately 500,000 people, and are expected to persist through October. The report noted that similar conditions are likely to prevail in other IDP sites in the El Fasher locality, notably in the Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps. (For background, see our 28 July and 5 August What’s in Blue stories.)
Mediation efforts aimed at resolving the conflict and securing humanitarian access have continued. In a 23 July press statement, the US announced that it had extended invitations to the SAF and the RSF to participate in ceasefire talks in Switzerland, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia, with the African Union (AU), Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UN participating as observers. The talks aimed to reach an agreement on a nationwide cessation of violence and to develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure implementation of any agreement. Although the RSF agreed to participate in the meeting, the SAF did not. It sent a delegation, headed by Sudanese Minister of Minerals Mohamed Bashir Abu Nommo, to Jeddah on 9 August to consult with the US on the proposed agenda and structure of the negotiations. These talks ended without agreement on the SAF’s participation in Switzerland, reportedly because of disagreements on several issues, including representation of civilian stakeholders at the talks and the composition of the SAF’s delegation.
Despite the SAF’s absence, the talks in Switzerland commenced on 14 August using a hybrid negotiating model that combined in-person, proximity and virtual modes to engage both parties. On 15 August, the Sudanese government announced its decision to authorise the opening of the Adre crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for three months for cross-border humanitarian operations. (Sudan suspended cross-border aid delivery through the Adre crossing on 21 February, citing concerns about potential weapons transfers into Darfur by the RSF.) In a 16 August statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Clementine Nkweta-Salami welcomed Sudan’s decision to open the Adre crossing, noting that it remained the “most effective and shortest route to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sudan at the scale and speed required, especially to Darfur”.
At the end of the talks in Switzerland on 23 August, the participants—collectively called the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group—adopted a communiqué. In addition to ensuring access through the Adre border crossing, the ALPS group obtained guarantees from the warring parties to provide safe and unhindered humanitarian access along the Dabbah Road, with access through the north and west of Port Sudan. The communiqué indicated that deliberations continued toward opening an access route through Sennar state, noting that the UN is undertaking a feasibility study for routes across the country that can enable aid access. It further noted that the ALPS group presented to the warring parties proposals for a compliance mechanism to resolve disputes, receive complaints, and address problems arising in relation to implementation of protection of civilian commitments. The communiqué expressed regret at SAF’s decision not to join the talks in Switzerland, which it said limited the group’s ability to make substantial progress on key issues, such as a cessation of hostilities.
Following the talks, media reports quoted General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, as saying during a press conference that the talks in Switzerland aimed to “whitewash” the RSF and countries supporting the paramilitary group. He reiterated the SAF’s refusal to negotiate with the RSF and objected to the UAE’s participation in the talks. (Sudanese authorities have accused the UAE of providing armaments and other material support to the RSF). In a press encounter on 27 August, US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello reportedly indicated a significant proliferation in the number of external actors fuelling the conflict. He said that the UAE is supporting the RSF, and that “foreign fighters” have arrived in Sudan from across the Sahel. He also accused Iran and Russia of supporting the SAF.
Sanctions Related Developments
On 19 August, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee met with its Panel of Experts to receive a briefing on the panel’s mid-term update, which was transmitted to Council members on 7 August. During the meeting, it appears that the US proposed two names for targeted sanctions.
It appears that the update report, which is not a public document, analysed the ongoing conflict in El Fasher, North Darfur—the only capital city in the five Darfur states outside the RSF’s control—including patterns of violence, the warfare tactics employed by the warring parties, and the impact on civilians and the region. The report apparently confirmed that all parties failed to distinguish between civilians and combatants in the hostilities in El Fasher. It noted that the indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure by all warring parties violated international humanitarian law and constituted war crimes. It further confirmed the presence and use of heavy weaponry by both sides, as well as military overflights by the SAF, in violation of the Sudan sanctions regime. The report described how the ongoing conflict has contributed to destabilising the region, particularly through ongoing recruitment campaigns in neighbouring countries such as Libya, Chad, and the CAR. (For background related to Sudan sanctions, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2024 Monthly Forecast and 17 June What’s in Blue story.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
The International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council in October 2023, visited Chad from 30 June to 18 July and travelled to several areas in eastern Chad along the border with Sudan, including Adre, Farchana, and Abeche. The mission met with victims and survivors of the conflict in Sudan as well as members of Sudanese civil society and the UN country team. In its press release following the visit, the mission reported that the Sudanese refugee community provided firsthand accounts of horrific acts, including killings, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, looting, the burning of houses, and the use of child soldiers. It indicated that many of these violations appear to be specifically targeted against professionals such as lawyers, human rights defenders, teachers, and doctors. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our August 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Women, Peace and Security
Kholood Khair, the founder and director of Confluence Advisory, a think tank formerly based in Khartoum, briefed the Council during the 7 August meeting titled “Sustaining women, peace and security commitments in the context of accelerated drawdown of peace operations”. Among other issues, she focused on the exits of the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID, in 2020) and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS, in 2023). Khair called the timing of UNAMID’s withdrawal “a massive miscalculation”, noting that it “took place before any alternative national force could be set up in its stead”, leading to a “gaping protection vacuum”. Although women’s rights activists “implored the international community to let UNAMID stay”, she said that their voices were ignored.
Regarding UNITAMS, Khair noted that the limited mandate given to the mission and its hasty termination represented “another instance where the perspectives and needs of Sudanese women were not considered” by the Council. She added that in the wake of UNITAMS’ departure, and despite reports of sexual violence, “the UN has not established adequate monitoring and reporting arrangements” on the situation in Sudan.
Khair provided several recommendations, including establishing a diplomatic track complementary to but separate from ongoing ceasefire talks focused on “addressing violence against civilians, with targeted measures for the protection of women and girls, including from conflict-related sexual violence”. Noting that the flow of arms is “exposing women and girls to horrific forms of gender-based violence”, she recommended expanding the arms embargo across Sudan and adding conflict-related sexual violence as a stand-alone designation criterion for targeted individual sanctions. She further called on all actors working on the ceasefire talks—including the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy Ramtane Lamamra—to ensure the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women.
Key Issues and Options
An immediate key issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). One option for the Council members is to extend the panel’s mandate for one year. Some members may also suggest extending the sanctions regime until March 2025, aligning it with the mandate cycle of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions regime, most recently renewed by resolution 2725.
Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime is another important issue for Council members. On several occasions, most recently in resolution 2736 of 13 June, the Council has reiterated its call on all member states to refrain “from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability and instead to support efforts for a durable peace”. The resolution reminded all parties to the conflict and member states that facilitate the transfers of arms and military material to Darfur of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo measures and that those who violate the arms embargo may be designated for targeted measures.
During the 13 June Council briefing on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Sudan called on the Council to identify and hold accountable the states that support and arm the RSF. He argued that “there is no reason to maintain the Darfur sanctions if they do not include the countries involved in violating the relevant Council resolutions, namely, the UAE and Chad”.
Along with extending the sanctions measure, Council members could also encourage the panel to collaborate with other panels of experts, particularly those assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, and the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee. In this regard, chairs of the respective committees could consider holding joint committee meetings in order to facilitate an exchange of information about the regional impacts of the conflicts in these countries.
Keeping in mind the information brought forth by the Panel of Experts reports, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, expanding the geographical scope of the measures to the rest of the country, the designation criteria, and additional listings of individuals and entities under the current regime.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members share similar concerns about the political, security, human rights, and humanitarian situations in Sudan. Members have had diverging views about the utility of the Sudan sanctions regime. Several members have underlined the importance of the Panel of Experts’ reporting on the humanitarian and security situations and in identifying violations of the sanctions regime. During the 13 June Council meeting, however, Russia argued that Council sanctions have failed to stabilise the situation in Darfur, noting that weapons continue to flow into the region illegally. It expressed the view that “any restrictions imposed by the Security Council, especially if we consider the option of expanding them, will not bring peace closer”.
Continuing sanctions regime violations and lack of accountability have contributed to frustration among some Council members. At the 13 June Council meeting, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), who serves as the committee’s chair, said in his national capacity that “[w]e are receiving the observation of the panel of experts about a considerable amount of supply and use of foreign weapons in Darfur on a daily basis”. Talking about the measures against arms embargo violations, he said that the “consensus-based nature of the Sanctions Committee tends to result in having to resort to the least common denominator”. He called on Council members to collectively take concrete action to guarantee the effective implementation and strengthening of the current sanctions regime.
Since the start of the conflict, the US has imposed bilateral sanctions on several individuals and entities for exacerbating Sudan’s instability. In its most recent round of sanctions, the US designated two individuals on 15 May for their role in leading the RSF’s war campaign; one of them was reported to have been instrumental in the RSF’s operations in Darfur, including its offensives in North Darfur. The UK has also introduced bilateral sanctions against at least nine entities linked to the warring parties.
Similarly, the EU has issued restrictive measures against six entities and six individuals responsible for supporting activities that undermine the stability and political transition in Sudan.
The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 13 June 2024S/RES/2736 | The resolution demanded that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) halt the siege of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and further called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher. |
| 8 March 2024S/RES/2725 | The resolution extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2025. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 13 June 2024S/PV.9656 | This was a briefing on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. |
