Syria
Expected Council Action
In September, the Council expects to hold two meetings on Syria: one on the political and humanitarian issues and another on the chemical weapons track.
Key Recent Developments
Syria remains mired in a civil war, now in its 14th year, marked by fighting on multiple fronts and a lack of progress on the political process. The Syrian Constitutional Committee has not met since June 2022 because Russia, a close ally of Syria, has opposed Geneva as the venue for Committee meetings, following Switzerland’s imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In his remarks at the 22 July Council meeting on Syria, Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen acknowledged the increasing frustration among regional and international stakeholders who, he said, perceive the status quo as “dangerous and unsustainable” and added that interest in Syria is waning in “some quarters”. He stressed the need for an approach that encompasses all relevant military, political or economic actors and addresses the range of issues that continue to drive the conflict or are directly relevant to its resolution.
In a 12 August press release, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) welcomed the Syrian government’s decision to extend its authorisation for the use of the Bab al-Salam and Al Ra’ee border crossings at the Syria-Türkiye border—used by UN humanitarian agencies and their partners for conducting cross-border humanitarian operations—until 13 November. Humanitarian operations have also continued through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing at the Syria-Türkiye border, which, according to OCHA, is an essential lifeline for reaching millions of Syrians in north-west Syria who remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance, including food, nutrition, health, shelter, protection, education, and other critical support.
The situation in north-east Syria remains volatile. Since 6 August, significant escalation in hostilities has been reported on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in Deir-ez-Zor governorate, following the outbreak of fighting between pro-government forces, allegedly backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a primarily Kurdish group opposing the Syrian government. An 11 August OCHA flash update reported that critical public infrastructure had been targeted or used for military purposes, resulting in heightened risks for civilian access to essential services on both banks of the river. Despite the scale of hostilities, the update said there had been no shift in territorial control. As at 14 August, the clashes had resulted in the death of at least 37 people, with 43 others injured, according to European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.
Tensions have continued to intensify across the region against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war that erupted on 7 October 2023. The escalation has resulted in increased violence spilling over into Syria, where sites have frequently been the target of attacks. Israel and the US have historically targeted positions associated with Iranian forces and affiliated militants in Syria, and Iran-linked proxy groups have been accused of attacking US forces stationed in the region. On 5 August, a US military air base in western Iraq was struck by rocket fire, allegedly by Iranian-backed militias, injuring at least five US soldiers. On 9 August, US and coalition forces deployed at Rumalyn Landing Zone (an international coalition base) in eastern Syria were attacked using a one-way attack uncrewed aerial system. The strike resulted in injuries to eight US service members. According to a 13 August Reuters article, Iranian-backed militias targeted the international coalition base in the Koniko gas field in the Deir-ez-Zor countryside earlier that day; however, the base was not hit and no injuries were reported.
In response to the recent surge in tensions following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on 31 July, the US announced adjustments in its military posture in the Middle East to improve US force protection and defend Israel. In a 2 August press release, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh announced the deployment of a strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and additional ballistic missile defence-capable cruisers and destroyers to the US European and Central Command regions. The US has also deployed an additional fighter squadron to the region to reinforce defensive air support capabilities. (For background and more information on regional developments, see the brief on Lebanon in our August Monthly Forecast.)
On 24 July, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) released the monthly report on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, which required the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. The report said that the 27th round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) of the OPCW and the Syrian authorities took place in Damascus in May. During this round, the DAT requested explanations from the Syrian authorities regarding the results of analysis of the samples it collected between September 2020 and April 2023. The results indicated potentially undeclared activities related to several chemical warfare agents. The report noted that considering the unresolved gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain, the declaration submitted by Syria cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for Council members is the ongoing hostilities in Syria. Continuing violence and the lack of accountability threaten to destabilise the country further. The deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in the country are also of concern. Determining how the Council can address the spillover effects of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and de-escalate rising tensions in the region, including in Syria, is an important issue for the Council.
One option would be for the co-chairs of the Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians (Switzerland and the UK) to hold a meeting on the situation in Syria to receive briefings from relevant UN entities about the impact of the conflict on civilians.
As well, a key issue is how to alleviate the growing humanitarian needs throughout the country. According to OCHA, approximately 16.7 million people—nearly 70 percent of Syria’s population—remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance, with 15.4 million people facing acute food insecurity. Despite the rising humanitarian needs across the country, securing funding has been a challenge for the UN and partner agencies. At the time of writing, Syria’s 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan, which requires $4.07 billion, was only 24.1 percent funded. Council members may call on donors to quickly disburse funding commitments and scale up the humanitarian response in Syria. At the 27 May EU-sponsored eighth Brussels Conference, the donor community pledged €7.5 billion, including €5 billion in grants and €2.5 billion in loans for 2024 and future years.
The need to break the underlying political impasse in the country and support the Special Envoy’s work in this regard is another key issue. The Council could consider holding a private meeting with stakeholders to discuss the impediments to the resumption of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, including the issue of venue, and support Pedersen’s efforts to reinvigorate the political process. (A private meeting is a closed, formal meeting format; unlike closed consultations, non-Council member states are allowed to participate in this format.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 3 August, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (COI) released a position paper on the tenth anniversary of the “Yazidi genocide” committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). The paper called for the repatriation of alleged members of ISIL from third countries and their prosecution for international crimes, including gender-based crimes, in national courts. The COI also expressed support for establishing an international victims’ reparation fund to ensure justice and accountability in Syria.
Council Dynamics
Over the years, Syria has been one of the most divisive files on the Council’s agenda. China and Russia are supportive of the Syrian government, emphasising the need to respect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and drawing connections between unilateral coercive measures on Syria and the challenging humanitarian and economic situations in the country. In contrast, the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded members criticise the government for violating international humanitarian law and human rights law, arbitrarily detaining people, not engaging meaningfully in political dialogue, and not creating conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees.
Russia has consistently criticised the presence of US forces in Syria, accusing them of destabilising the country. The US maintains that its deployment of forces in the country remains focused on fighting Da’esh and has blamed Damascus for allowing Iranian-backed militias to operate in the country.
With regard to the chemical weapons track, Council members have displayed starkly different views over the years on a range of related issues, including responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the credibility of the work of the OPCW, and numerous procedural aspects of the OPCW’s decision-making bodies. While several members have consistently expressed support for the OPCW’s work, maintaining that it is credible and essential, other members, such as China and Russia, claim that its work is biased and politicised.
Switzerland is the penholder on the Syria humanitarian file.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 31 July 2024S/2024/584 | This was a letter from Iran accusing Israel of the killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on 31 July. The letter invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter saying that Iran will not hesitate to “respond decisively and promptly”. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 22 July 2024S/PV.9690 | This was a meeting on the political and humanitarian situations in Syria. |
