What's In Blue

Posted Tue 6 Aug 2024

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Vote on a Draft Resolution Authorising Support to SAMIDRC

This afternoon (6 August), the Security Council will vote on a draft resolution authorising the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to provide operational and logistical support to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), which has been operating in eastern DRC since December 2023.

Background

Resolution 2717 of 19 December 2023, which last renewed MONUSCO’s mandate, requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on possible UN support to SAMIDRC, including recommendations on the matter. This report, submitted on 28 June after consultations with the Congolese government and other stakeholders, presented three options for Council members’ consideration. (For more information, see our 5 July What’s in Blue story.)

Council members discussed the report and its recommendations during their 8 July briefing on the situation in the DRC. At that meeting, the UK emphasised that support for SAMIDRC should not compromise MONUSCO’s ability to fulfil its current mandate. It also warned against the mission being drawn into the escalating regional conflict and highlighted the importance of finding a political solution through ongoing regional peace initiatives. The US echoed this message, stressing that the Council should avoid actions that could exacerbate regional tensions and hinder efforts towards a political resolution of the conflict. Therefore, it advocated that the Council authorise MONUSCO to provide only limited support to SAMIDRC “within its area of deployment, in furtherance of its mandate, without prejudice to its tasks and within existing resources”. Switzerland added that such support should be grounded in the implementation of the UN human rights due diligence policy, with a particular emphasis on protecting civilians.

On the other hand, the “A3 plus one” grouping (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) expressed its support for the position of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), which in a 4 March communiqué endorsed the deployment of the SADC mission. China advocated for a “reasonable adjustment” to MONUSCO’s mandate to ensure effective coordination and complementarity with SAMIDRC. Russia favoured extending support for the SADC contingent as part of broader regional efforts to stabilise the situation in eastern DRC.

In an 8 July letter to the Security Council, Rwanda argued that SAMIDRC is not a neutral force and should not receive any support. On the other hand, in a letter dated 25 May, the DRC had expressed support for SAMIDRC, reiterating the AUPSC’s endorsement of the mission. On 30 July, during a meeting mediated by Angola, the DRC and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement, which took effect on 4 August. The draft resolution in blue welcomes the signing of this agreement.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

France and Sierra Leone, the co-penholders on the DRC, circulated the initial draft of the text on 19 July and convened two rounds of negotiations, on 23 and 30 July. They then circulated a revised text on 31 July, incorporating comments made by Council members, and placed it under silence until 1 August. China broke silence, requesting the inclusion of its proposed language on several issues, including on the need to ensure complementarity between the full operationalisation of SAMIDRC and the MONUSCO disengagement plan, which was agreed with the Congolese government and endorsed by the Security Council through resolution 2717. After the silence break, other Council members reiterated some of their comments. The co-penholders made further revisions to the draft text and put it directly in blue yesterday (5 August), to be voted on this afternoon.

The negotiations on the draft text were apparently difficult because of differences among members over the desirable extent of MONUSCO’s support to SAMIDRC. During the negotiations, the “A3 plus one”, as well as China and Russia, sought to remove the word “limited” in describing the use of MONUSCO’s logistical assets and capabilities in support of SAMIDRC. However, several Council members—including the US and other like-minded members—maintained that this support should be considered within existing resources, in line with the parameters outlined in resolution 2717, as well as taking into account the safety and security of the UN personnel. It seems that the US and like-minded members also raised issues concerning the utilisation of MONUSCO’s air assets and armoured vehicles, seeking to ensure that it is done only on a case-by-case basis.

It appears that the co-penholders tried to propose a compromise by removing the word “limited” in describing the use of MONUSCO’s logistical assets and military capabilities, while adding language stating that the support would be provided within existing resources. The draft text in blue authorises MONUSCO to “support SAMIDRC through enhanced coordination, information-sharing and technical assistance as well as use of MONUSCO’s logistical assets and military capabilities, within the area of MONUSCO’s deployment, consistent with paragraph 20 of resolution 2717 (2023) and within existing resources, in furtherance of MONUSCO’s mandate, with due consideration for the safety and security of UN personnel”.

The co-penholders also added language stressing that “MONUSCO’s provision of such support to SAMIDRC is determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for DRC and Head of MONUSCO in close consultation with the MONUSCO and SAMIDRC Force Commanders, and without affecting MONUSCO’s capacity to implement its mandate and strategic priorities”. This seems to be in line with the Secretary-General’s report and what the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita explained to the Council during its 8 July meeting. The co-penholders also added language qualifying the utilisation of MONUSCO’s air assets and armoured vehicles by excluding the mission’s involvement in combat operations.

Another issue during the negotiations was China’s suggestion to add operative language stressing the need to ensure coherence and complementarity between MONUSCO and SAMIDRC, avoiding duplication of effort, and expressing the Council’s intention to review and adjust MONUSCO’s mandate according to the needs of the DRC government and the situation on the ground. China also proposed operative language on building the DRC’s national capacity to mitigate the effects of MONUSCO’s drawdown. other Council members, such as the UK and the US, did not. China broke silence to reiterate its position on these issues. In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders tried to accommodate China by adding text based on agreed language from resolution 2717 that stresses the importance of “ensuring coherence, coordination, complementarity and efficient articulation of efforts” between MONUSCO, the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), and SAMIDRC.

There was some discussion about the MONUSCO disengagement process during the negotiations. It seems that Russia was of the view that the text should focus on the provision of support to SAMIDRC, proposing either to remove references to the MONUSCO disengagement process or moving them to the preambular section. The co-penholders therefore restructured the text to give more emphasis to the support to SAMIDRC and moved some operative language on the disengagement process to the preambular section.

It seems that language related to the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda also required discussion. Russia apparently proposed to delete an operative paragraph that underlined the need to consider a gender perspective in implementing all aspects of SAMIDRC’s strategic concept of operations. While accepting Russia’s proposal to delete this paragraph, the co-penholders added a different WPS reference in the text in blue, indicating that MONUSCO’s support to SAMIDRC in terms of technical advice and support on the protection of civilians should include the protection of women and girls.

Finally, there was an issue with the reporting timelines proposed in the draft text because of a desire by some members to align them with MONUSCO’s reporting cycle. (The upcoming reports are due by September and December.) The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General to provide updates on the disengagement process and asks SAMIDRC to report on its activities by 15 November, ahead of MONUSCO’s mandate renewal in December.

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